HeldCertificate.Builder()
        .serialNumber(1L)
        .certificateAuthority(4)
        .commonName("attacker ca")
        .build()
    val attackerIntermediate =
      HeldCertificate.Builder()
        .serialNumber(2L)
        .certificateAuthority(3)
        .commonName("attacker")
        .signedBy(attackerCa)
        .build()
    val pinnedRoot =
      HeldCertificate.Builder()

   * saving space.
   */
  @VisibleForTesting static final double MAX_LOAD_FACTOR = 1.2;

  /**
   * Maximum allowed false positive probability of detecting a hash flooding attack given random
   * input.
   */
  @VisibleForTesting static final double HASH_FLOODING_FPP = 0.001;

  /**
   * Maximum allowed length of a hash table bucket before falling back to a j.u.HashMap based

    # Return some error
    ...
```

But by using the `secrets.compare_digest()` it will be secure against a type of attacks called "timing attacks".

### Timing Attacks

But what's a "timing attack"?

Let's imagine some attackers are trying to guess the username and password.

And they send a request with a username `johndoe` and a password `love123`.

mitigate the risk in this scenario is to sandbox the model execution.

### Hardware attacks

Physical GPUs or TPUs can also be the target of attacks. [Published
research](https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=gpu+side+channel) shows that it
might be possible to use side channel attacks on the GPU to leak data from other
running models or processes in the same system. GPUs can also have

        br.addElement("Against for CVE-2014-0050 (JVN14876762).");
        br.addElement("Boundary size is limited by Framework.");
        br.addElement("Too long boundary is treated as 404 because it's thought of as attack.");
        br.addElement("");
        br.addElement("While, you can override the boundary limit size");
        br.addElement(" in " + getClass().getSimpleName() + ".");
        br.addItem("Content Type");

    # Return some error
    ...
```

Porém, ao utilizar o `secrets.compare_digest()`, isso estará seguro contra um tipo de ataque chamado "timing attacks" (ataques de temporização).

### Ataques de Temporização

Mas o que é um "timing attack" (ataque de temporização)?

Vamos imaginar que alguns invasores estão tentando adivinhar o usuário e a senha.

  /**
   * @throws IllegalArgumentException if another entry in the bucket has the same key
   * @throws BucketOverflowException if this bucket has too many entries, which may indicate a hash
   *     flooding attack
   */
  private static void checkNoConflictInValueBucket(
      Object value, Entry<?, ?> entry, @CheckForNull ImmutableMapEntry<?, ?> valueBucketHead)
      throws BucketOverflowException {
    int bucketSize = 0;

 *
 * ```java
 * String attack = "http://example.com/static/images/../../../../../etc/passwd";
 * System.out.println(new URL(attack).getPath());
 * System.out.println(new URI(attack).getPath());
 * System.out.println(HttpUrl.parse(attack).encodedPath());
 * ```
 *
 * By canonicalizing the input paths, they are complicit in directory traversal attacks. Code that
 * checks only the path prefix may suffer!
 *

  @VisibleForTesting @CheckForNull transient @Nullable Object[] elements;

  /**
   * Keeps track of metadata like the number of hash table bits and modifications of this data
   * structure (to make it possible to throw ConcurrentModificationException in the iterator). Note
   * that we choose not to make this volatile, so we do less of a "best effort" to track such
   * errors, for better performance.
   */
  private transient int metadata;

  @VisibleForTesting @CheckForNull transient @Nullable Object[] elements;

  /**
   * Keeps track of metadata like the number of hash table bits and modifications of this data
   * structure (to make it possible to throw ConcurrentModificationException in the iterator). Note
   * that we choose not to make this volatile, so we do less of a "best effort" to track such
   * errors, for better performance.
   */
  private transient int metadata;