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docs/en/docs/advanced/security/http-basic-auth.md
# Return some error ... ``` But by using the `secrets.compare_digest()` it will be secure against a type of attacks called "timing attacks". ### Timing Attacks But what's a "timing attack"? Let's imagine some attackers are trying to guess the username and password. And they send a request with a username `johndoe` and a password `love123`.
Registered: Sun Nov 03 07:19:11 UTC 2024 - Last Modified: Sat Oct 26 16:01:27 UTC 2024 - 4.8K bytes - Viewed (0) -
docs/de/docs/advanced/security/http-basic-auth.md
# Einen Error zurückgeben ... ``` Aber durch die Verwendung von `secrets.compare_digest()` ist dieser Code sicher vor einer Art von Angriffen, die „Timing-Angriffe“ genannt werden. ### Timing-Angriffe Aber was ist ein „Timing-Angriff“? Stellen wir uns vor, dass einige Angreifer versuchen, den Benutzernamen und das Passwort zu erraten.
Registered: Sun Nov 03 07:19:11 UTC 2024 - Last Modified: Sun Oct 27 15:25:54 UTC 2024 - 5.8K bytes - Viewed (0) -
ci/official/code_check_full.sh
# limitations under the License. # ============================================================================== source "${BASH_SOURCE%/*}/utilities/setup.sh"
Registered: Tue Nov 05 12:39:12 UTC 2024 - Last Modified: Tue Feb 06 17:29:44 UTC 2024 - 840 bytes - Viewed (0) -
android/guava-tests/benchmark/com/google/common/math/BigIntegerMathBenchmark.java
slowFactorials[i] = RANDOM_SOURCE.nextInt(factorialBound); binomials[i] = RANDOM_SOURCE.nextInt(factorials[i] + 1); } } /** Previous version of BigIntegerMath.factorial, kept for timing purposes. */ private static BigInteger oldSlowFactorial(int n) { if (n <= 20) { return BigInteger.valueOf(LongMath.factorial(n)); } else { int k = 20;
Registered: Fri Nov 01 12:43:10 UTC 2024 - Last Modified: Mon Aug 19 16:21:24 UTC 2024 - 3.4K bytes - Viewed (0) -
ci/official/code_check_changed_files.sh
# limitations under the License. # ============================================================================== source "${BASH_SOURCE%/*}/utilities/setup.sh"
Registered: Tue Nov 05 12:39:12 UTC 2024 - Last Modified: Thu Oct 05 18:41:59 UTC 2023 - 850 bytes - Viewed (0) -
ci/official/containers/linux_arm64/devel.usertools/rename_and_verify_wheels.sh
Registered: Tue Nov 05 12:39:12 UTC 2024 - Last Modified: Mon Sep 18 19:00:37 UTC 2023 - 1.3K bytes - Viewed (0) -
docs/pt/docs/advanced/security/http-basic-auth.md
# Return some error ... ``` Porém, ao utilizar o `secrets.compare_digest()`, isso estará seguro contra um tipo de ataque chamado "timing attacks" (ataques de temporização). ### Ataques de Temporização Mas o que é um "timing attack" (ataque de temporização)? Vamos imaginar que alguns invasores estão tentando adivinhar o usuário e a senha.
Registered: Sun Nov 03 07:19:11 UTC 2024 - Last Modified: Sun Oct 06 20:36:54 UTC 2024 - 6.2K bytes - Viewed (0) -
internal/lsync/lrwmutex.go
success := lm.unlock(isWriteLock) if !success { panic("Trying to Unlock() while no Lock() is active") } } // RUnlock releases a read lock held on lm. // // It is a run-time error if lm is not locked on entry to RUnlock. func (lm *LRWMutex) RUnlock() { isWriteLock := false success := lm.unlock(isWriteLock) if !success { panic("Trying to RUnlock() while no RLock() is active") } }
Registered: Sun Nov 03 19:28:11 UTC 2024 - Last Modified: Sun Jan 02 17:15:06 UTC 2022 - 4.8K bytes - Viewed (0) -
guava-tests/benchmark/com/google/common/math/BigIntegerMathBenchmark.java
slowFactorials[i] = RANDOM_SOURCE.nextInt(factorialBound); binomials[i] = RANDOM_SOURCE.nextInt(factorials[i] + 1); } } /** Previous version of BigIntegerMath.factorial, kept for timing purposes. */ private static BigInteger oldSlowFactorial(int n) { if (n <= 20) { return BigInteger.valueOf(LongMath.factorial(n)); } else { int k = 20;
Registered: Fri Nov 01 12:43:10 UTC 2024 - Last Modified: Mon Aug 19 16:21:24 UTC 2024 - 3.4K bytes - Viewed (0) -
common-protos/k8s.io/api/events/v1beta1/generated.proto
// Events have a limited retention time and triggers and messages may evolve // with time. Event consumers should not rely on the timing of an event // with a given Reason reflecting a consistent underlying trigger, or the // continued existence of events with that Reason. Events should be // treated as informative, best-effort, supplemental data. message Event {
Registered: Wed Nov 06 22:53:10 UTC 2024 - Last Modified: Mon Mar 11 18:43:24 UTC 2024 - 5.2K bytes - Viewed (0)