double avgTime = timings.stream().mapToLong(Long::longValue).average().orElse(0.0);
                long maxTime = timings.stream().mapToLong(Long::longValue).max().orElse(0L);
                long minTime = timings.stream().mapToLong(Long::longValue).min().orElse(0L);

                double variance = (maxTime - minTime) / avgTime;
                // JVM timing in concurrent scenarios is inherently variable

    # Return some error
    ...
```

But by using the `secrets.compare_digest()` it will be secure against a type of attacks called "timing attacks".

### Timing Attacks { #timing-attacks }

But what's a "timing attack"?

Let's imagine some attackers are trying to guess the username and password.

And they send a request with a username `johndoe` and a password `love123`.

   *     annotation type, rather than an interface
   */
  <T> T newProxy(T target, Class<T> interfaceType, long timeoutDuration, TimeUnit timeoutUnit);

  /**
   * Invokes a specified Callable, timing out after the specified time limit. If the target method
   * call finishes before the limit is reached, the return value or a wrapped exception is

        assertTrue(
                later.minus(initial).toMillis() >= 45,
                "Elapsed time difference should be at least 45ms (accounting for some timing variance)");
    }

    @Test
    @DisplayName("MonotonicClock start time should remain constant")
    void testStartTime() throws InterruptedException {
        Instant start1 = MonotonicClock.start();

package org.apache.maven.api;

import java.time.Clock;
import java.time.Duration;
import java.time.Instant;
import java.time.ZoneId;
import java.time.ZoneOffset;

/**
 * A Clock implementation that combines monotonic timing with wall-clock time.
 * <p>
 * This class provides precise time measurements using {@link System#nanoTime()}
 * while maintaining wall-clock time information in UTC. The wall-clock time

    # Return some error
    ...
```

Pero al usar `secrets.compare_digest()` será seguro contra un tipo de ataques llamados "timing attacks".

### Timing Attacks

¿Pero qué es un "timing attack"?

Imaginemos que algunos atacantes están tratando de adivinar el nombre de usuario y la contraseña.

Y envían un request con un nombre de usuario `johndoe` y una contraseña `love123`.

    # Einen Error zurückgeben
    ...
```

Aber durch die Verwendung von `secrets.compare_digest()` ist dieser Code sicher vor einer Art von Angriffen, die „Timing-Angriffe“ genannt werden.

### Timing-Angriffe

Aber was ist ein „Timing-Angriff“?

Stellen wir uns vor, dass einige Angreifer versuchen, den Benutzernamen und das Passwort zu erraten.

import org.codelibs.fess.exception.FessSystemException;
import org.codelibs.fess.util.ComponentUtil;

/**
 * Helper class for controlling crawler execution intervals and timing.
 * This class manages crawler execution timing based on configurable rules
 * that can specify different delays for different time periods and days.
 */
public class IntervalControlHelper {

# limitations under the License.
# ==============================================================================
source "${BASH_SOURCE%/*}/utilities/setup.sh"

        return new EncryptionResult(ciphertext, authTag);
    }

    /**
     * Perform constant-time encryption to prevent timing attacks
     */
    private byte[] performConstantTimeEncryption(Cipher cipher, byte[] message) throws Exception {
        // Pad to fixed block size to prevent timing leaks
        int blockSize = cipher.getBlockSize();
        if (blockSize == 0)
            blockSize = 16; // GCM mode