### Hardware attacks

Physical GPUs or TPUs can also be the target of attacks. [Published
research](https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=gpu+side+channel) shows that it
might be possible to use side channel attacks on the GPU to leak data from other
running models or processes in the same system. GPUs can also have
implementation bugs that might allow attackers to leave malicious code running

- For volumes that allow attaches across multiple nodes, attach and detach operations across different nodes are now executed in parallel. ([#88678](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/88678), [@verult](https://github.com/verult)) [SIG Apps, Node and Storage]

the problem. If possible, please share a link to or attach code demonstrating
the problem.

**Any other info / logs**
Include any logs or source code that would be helpful to diagnose the problem.
If including tracebacks, please include the full traceback. Large logs and files

```
(You can paste links or attach files by dragging & dropping them below)
- Provide links to your updated versions of the above two colab notebooks.
- Provide links to your TensorFlow model and (optionally) TensorFlow Lite Model.
```

#### Option B: Paste your code here or provide a link to a custom end-to-end colab

```
(You can paste links or attach files by dragging & dropping them below)

## CSRF Risk { #csrf-risk }

This default behavior provides protection against a class of **Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)** attacks in a very specific scenario.

These attacks exploit the fact that browsers allow scripts to send requests without doing any CORS preflight check when they:

* don't have a `Content-Type` header (e.g. using `fetch()` with a `Blob` body)

### 3. Configure `mc` and create another user user1 with attached policy user1policy

```
mc alias set myminio-admin1 http://localhost:9000 admin1 admin123 --api s3v4

mc admin user add myminio-admin1 user1 user123
mc admin policy attach myminio-admin1 user1policy ~/user1policy.json
mc admin policy attach myminio-admin1 user1policy --user=user1
```

  if [ ! -z $POLICY -a $POLICY != " " ] ; then
      echo "Adding policy '$POLICY' for '$USER'"
      set +e ; # policy already attach errors out, allow it.
      ${MC} admin policy attach myminio $POLICY --user=$USER
      set -e
  else
      echo "User '$USER' has no policy attached."
  fi
}

# Try connecting to MinIO instance
{{- if .Values.tls.enabled }}
scheme=https
{{- else }}
scheme=http
{{- end }}

    # Bir hata döndür
    ...
```

Ancak `secrets.compare_digest()` kullanarak, "timing attacks" denilen bir saldırı türüne karşı güvenli olursunuz.

### Timing Attacks { #timing-attacks }

Peki "timing attack" nedir?

Bazı saldırganların kullanıcı adı ve şifreyi tahmin etmeye çalıştığını düşünelim.

    # Поверніть якусь помилку
    ...
```

Але використовуючи `secrets.compare_digest()`, це буде захищено від типу атак, що називаються «атаки за часом» (timing attacks).

### Атаки за часом { #timing-attacks }

Що таке «атака за часом»?

Уявімо, що зловмисники намагаються вгадати ім'я користувача та пароль.

Вони надсилають запит з ім'ям користувача `johndoe` та паролем `love123`.

    # Devuelve algún error
    ...
```

Pero al usar `secrets.compare_digest()` será seguro contra un tipo de ataques llamados "timing attacks".

### Timing attacks { #timing-attacks }

¿Pero qué es un "timing attack"?

Imaginemos que algunos atacantes están tratando de adivinar el nombre de usuario y la contraseña.