These attacks exploit the fact that browsers allow scripts to send requests without doing any CORS preflight check when they:

* don't have a `Content-Type` header (e.g. using `fetch()` with a `Blob` body)
* and don't send any authentication credentials.

This type of attack is mainly relevant when:

        .Builder()
        .serialNumber(1L)
        .certificateAuthority(4)
        .commonName("attacker ca")
        .build()
    val attackerIntermediate =
      HeldCertificate
        .Builder()
        .serialNumber(2L)
        .certificateAuthority(3)
        .commonName("attacker")
        .signedBy(attackerCa)
        .build()
    val pinnedRoot =
      HeldCertificate
        .Builder()

    # Return some error
    ...
```

But by using the `secrets.compare_digest()` it will be secure against a type of attacks called "timing attacks".

### Timing Attacks { #timing-attacks }

But what's a "timing attack"?

Let's imagine some attackers are trying to guess the username and password.

And they send a request with a username `johndoe` and a password `love123`.

* plug-in: plug-in (do not translate to "complemento" or "extensión")
* plug-ins: plug-ins (do not translate to "complementos" or "extensiones")
* full stack: full stack (do not translate to "pila completa")
* full-stack: full-stack (do not translate to "de pila completa")
* stack: stack (do not translate to "pila")
* loop (as in async loop): loop (do not translate to "bucle" or "ciclo")

```Python
if not (credentials.username == "stanleyjobson") or not (credentials.password == "swordfish"):
    # 어떤 오류를 반환
    ...
```

하지만 `secrets.compare_digest()`를 사용하면 "timing attacks"라고 불리는 한 유형의 공격에 대해 안전해집니다.

### 타이밍 공격 { #timing-attacks }

그렇다면 "timing attack"이란 무엇일까요?

공격자들이 사용자명과 비밀번호를 추측하려고 한다고 가정해봅시다.

그리고 사용자명 `johndoe`, 비밀번호 `love123`으로 요청을 보냅니다.

그러면 애플리케이션의 Python 코드는 대략 다음과 같을 것입니다:

```Python

   * saving space.
   */
  @VisibleForTesting static final double MAX_LOAD_FACTOR = 1.2;

  /**
   * Maximum allowed false positive probability of detecting a hash flooding attack given random
   * input.
   */
  @VisibleForTesting static final double HASH_FLOODING_FPP = 0.001;

  /**
   * Maximum allowed length of a hash table bucket before falling back to a j.u.HashMap based

By default, OkHttp trusts the certificate authorities of the host platform. This strategy maximizes connectivity, but it is subject to certificate authority attacks such as the [2011 DigiNotar attack](https://www.computerworld.com/article/2510951/cybercrime-hacking/hackers-spied-on-300-000-iranians-using-fake-google-certificate.html). It also assumes your HTTPS servers’ certificates are signed by a certificate authority.

* mount (verb): монтировать
* mount (noun): точка монтирования / mount (keep in English if it's a FastAPI keyword)
* plugin: плагин
* plug-in: плагин
* full stack: full stack (do not translate)
* full-stack: full-stack (do not translate)
* loop (as in async loop): цикл событий
* Machine Learning: Машинное обучение
* Deep Learning: Глубокое обучение
* callback hell: callback hell (clarify as `ад обратных вызовов`)

        br.addElement("Against for CVE-2014-0050 (JVN14876762).");
        br.addElement("Boundary size is limited by Framework.");
        br.addElement("Too long boundary is treated as 404 because it's thought of as attack.");
        br.addElement("");
        br.addElement("While, you can override the boundary limit size");
        br.addElement(" in " + getClass().getSimpleName() + ".");
        br.addItem("Content Type");

- 没有 `Content-Type` 头（例如使用 `fetch()` 携带 `Blob` 作为 body）
- 且不发送任何认证凭据。

这种攻击主要在以下情况下相关：

- 应用在本地（如 `localhost`）或内网中运行
- 且应用没有任何认证，假定来自同一网络的请求都可信。

## 攻击示例 { #example-attack }

假设你构建了一个本地运行的 AI 代理。

它提供了一个 API，地址为

```
http://localhost:8000/v1/agents/multivac
```

另有一个前端，地址为

```
http://localhost:8000
```

/// tip | 提示

注意它们的主机相同。

///