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Results 1 - 10 of 54 for Timing (0.03 sec)

  1. docs/en/docs/advanced/security/http-basic-auth.md

        # Return some error
        ...
    ```
    
    But by using the `secrets.compare_digest()` it will be secure against a type of attacks called "timing attacks".
    
    ### Timing Attacks { #timing-attacks }
    
    But what's a "timing attack"?
    
    Let's imagine some attackers are trying to guess the username and password.
    
    And they send a request with a username `johndoe` and a password `love123`.
    
    Registered: Sun Dec 28 07:19:09 UTC 2025
    - Last Modified: Sun Aug 31 09:15:41 UTC 2025
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  2. docs/es/docs/advanced/security/http-basic-auth.md

        # Devuelve algún error
        ...
    ```
    
    Pero al usar `secrets.compare_digest()` será seguro contra un tipo de ataques llamados "timing attacks".
    
    ### Timing attacks { #timing-attacks }
    
    ¿Pero qué es un "timing attack"?
    
    Imaginemos que algunos atacantes están tratando de adivinar el nombre de usuario y la contraseña.
    
    Registered: Sun Dec 28 07:19:09 UTC 2025
    - Last Modified: Tue Dec 16 16:33:45 UTC 2025
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  3. docs/de/docs/advanced/security/http-basic-auth.md

        # Einen Error zurückgeben
        ...
    ```
    
    Aber durch die Verwendung von `secrets.compare_digest()` ist dieser Code sicher vor einer Art von Angriffen, die „Timing-Angriffe“ genannt werden.
    
    ### Timing-Angriffe { #timing-attacks }
    
    Aber was ist ein „Timing-Angriff“?
    
    Stellen wir uns vor, dass einige Angreifer versuchen, den Benutzernamen und das Passwort zu erraten.
    
    Registered: Sun Dec 28 07:19:09 UTC 2025
    - Last Modified: Sat Sep 20 15:10:09 UTC 2025
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  4. docs/pt/docs/advanced/security/http-basic-auth.md

        # Return some error
        ...
    ```
    
    Porém, ao utilizar o `secrets.compare_digest()`, isso estará seguro contra um tipo de ataque chamado "timing attacks" (ataques de temporização).
    
    ### Ataques de Temporização { #timing-attacks }
    
    Mas o que é um "timing attack" (ataque de temporização)?
    
    Vamos imaginar que alguns invasores estão tentando adivinhar o usuário e a senha.
    
    Registered: Sun Dec 28 07:19:09 UTC 2025
    - Last Modified: Wed Nov 12 16:23:57 UTC 2025
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  5. api/maven-api-core/src/main/java/org/apache/maven/api/MonotonicClock.java

    package org.apache.maven.api;
    
    import java.time.Clock;
    import java.time.Duration;
    import java.time.Instant;
    import java.time.ZoneId;
    import java.time.ZoneOffset;
    
    /**
     * A Clock implementation that combines monotonic timing with wall-clock time.
     * <p>
     * This class provides precise time measurements using {@link System#nanoTime()}
     * while maintaining wall-clock time information in UTC. The wall-clock time
    Registered: Sun Dec 28 03:35:09 UTC 2025
    - Last Modified: Wed Jan 15 06:28:29 UTC 2025
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  6. api/maven-api-core/src/test/java/org/apache/maven/api/MonotonicClockTest.java

            assertTrue(
                    later.minus(initial).toMillis() >= 45,
                    "Elapsed time difference should be at least 45ms (accounting for some timing variance)");
        }
    
        @Test
        @DisplayName("MonotonicClock start time should remain constant")
        void testStartTime() throws InterruptedException {
            Instant start1 = MonotonicClock.start();
    Registered: Sun Dec 28 03:35:09 UTC 2025
    - Last Modified: Wed Jan 15 06:28:29 UTC 2025
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  7. docs/es/llm-prompt.md

    * load balancer: load balancer (do not translate to "balanceador de carga")
    * load balance: load balance (do not translate to "balancear carga")
    * self hosting: self hosting (do not translate to "auto alojamiento")
    Registered: Sun Dec 28 07:19:09 UTC 2025
    - Last Modified: Tue Dec 16 16:33:45 UTC 2025
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  8. docs/ru/llm-prompt.md

    * Pydantic model: Pydantic-модель (`модель Pydantic` and `Pydantic модель` are also fine)
    * declare: объявить
    * have the next best performance, after: быть на следующем месте по производительности после
    * timing attack: тайминговая атака (clarify `атака по времени` if needed)
    * OAuth2 scope: OAuth2 scope (clarify `область` if needed)
    * TLS Termination Proxy: прокси-сервер TSL-терминации
    * utilize (resources): использовать
    Registered: Sun Dec 28 07:19:09 UTC 2025
    - Last Modified: Mon Oct 06 11:09:58 UTC 2025
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  9. android/guava-tests/benchmark/com/google/common/math/BigIntegerMathBenchmark.java

          slowFactorials[i] = RANDOM_SOURCE.nextInt(factorialBound);
          binomials[i] = RANDOM_SOURCE.nextInt(factorials[i] + 1);
        }
      }
    
      /** Previous version of BigIntegerMath.factorial, kept for timing purposes. */
      private static BigInteger oldSlowFactorial(int n) {
        if (n <= 20) {
          return BigInteger.valueOf(LongMath.factorial(n));
        } else {
          int k = 20;
    Registered: Fri Dec 26 12:43:10 UTC 2025
    - Last Modified: Thu Dec 19 18:03:30 UTC 2024
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  10. guava-tests/benchmark/com/google/common/math/BigIntegerMathBenchmark.java

          slowFactorials[i] = RANDOM_SOURCE.nextInt(factorialBound);
          binomials[i] = RANDOM_SOURCE.nextInt(factorials[i] + 1);
        }
      }
    
      /** Previous version of BigIntegerMath.factorial, kept for timing purposes. */
      private static BigInteger oldSlowFactorial(int n) {
        if (n <= 20) {
          return BigInteger.valueOf(LongMath.factorial(n));
        } else {
          int k = 20;
    Registered: Fri Dec 26 12:43:10 UTC 2025
    - Last Modified: Thu Dec 19 18:03:30 UTC 2024
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