*/
  @Override
  @CheckForNull
  protected final char[] escape(char c) {
    if (c < replacementsLength) {
      char[] chars = replacements[c];
      if (chars != null) {
        return chars;
      }
    }
    if (c >= safeMin && c <= safeMax) {
      return null;
    }
    return escapeUnsafe(c);
  }

  /**
   * Escapes a {@code char} value that has no direct explicit value in the replacement array and

### Validation

* Validation pour la plupart (ou tous?) les **types de données** Python incluant:
    * objets JSON (`dict`).
    * listes JSON (`list`) définissant des types d'éléments.
    * Champs String (`str`), définition de longueur minimum ou maximale.
    * Nombres (`int`, `float`) avec valeur minimale and maximale, etc.

* Validation pour des types plus exotiques, tel que:
    * URL.
    * Email.

        }

        // normalize
        final StringBuilder buf = new StringBuilder(1000);
        for (int i = 0; i < configPath.length(); i++) {
            final char c = configPath.charAt(i);
            if (c == '\\') {
                buf.append('/');
            } else if (c == ' ') {
                buf.append("%20");
            } else if (CharUtil.isUrlChar(c)) {

        }
        if( !Character.isDigit( host.charAt(0) )) {
            return (NbtAddress)doNameQuery( new Name( host, type, scope ), svr );
        } else {
            int IP = 0x00;
            int hitDots = 0;
            char[] data = host.toCharArray();

            for( int i = 0; i < data.length; i++ ) {
                char c = data[i];
                if( c < 48 || c > 57 ) {

    # Return some error
    ...
```

Porém, ao utilizar o `secrets.compare_digest()`, isso estará seguro contra um tipo de ataque chamado "timing attacks" (ataques de temporização).

### Ataques de Temporização

Mas o que é um "timing attack" (ataque de temporização)?

Vamos imaginar que alguns invasores estão tentando adivinhar o usuário e a senha.

   *     Stream.of("banana", "apple", "carrot", "asparagus", "cherry")
   *         .collect(
   *             flatteningToImmutableListMultimap(
   *                  str -> str.charAt(0),
   *                  str -> str.substring(1).chars().mapToObj(c -> (char) c));
   *
   * // is equivalent to
   *
   * static final ImmutableListMultimap<Character, Character> FIRST_LETTER_MULTIMAP =

     */
    @Override
    public String firstCalledName () {

        this.calledName = this.hostName.name;

        if ( Character.isDigit(this.calledName.charAt(0)) ) {
            int i, len, dots;
            char[] data;

            i = dots = 0; /* quick IP address validation */
            len = this.calledName.length();
            data = this.calledName.toCharArray();

    }

    private int parseResponseCode() throws IOException {
        try {
            String response = connection.getHeaderField(0);
            int index = response.indexOf(' ');
            while (response.charAt(index) == ' ') index++;
            return Integer.parseInt(response.substring(index, index + 3));
        } catch (Exception ex) {
            throw new IOException(ex.getMessage());
        }
    }

          "radix must be between MIN_RADIX and MAX_RADIX but was " + radix);
    }
    boolean negative = string.charAt(0) == '-';
    int index = negative ? 1 : 0;
    if (index == string.length()) {
      return null;
    }
    int digit = AsciiDigits.digit(string.charAt(index++));
    if (digit < 0 || digit >= radix) {
      return null;
    }
    long accum = -digit;

    if (!PART_CHAR_MATCHER.matchesAllOf(asciiChars)) {
      return false;
    }

    // No initial or final dashes or underscores.

    if (DASH_MATCHER.matches(part.charAt(0))
        || DASH_MATCHER.matches(part.charAt(part.length() - 1))) {
      return false;
    }

    /*
     * Note that we allow (in contravention of a strict interpretation of the relevant RFCs) domain