}

	// Lookup user DN
	lookupResult, err := l.LDAP.LookupUsername(conn, username)
	if err != nil {
		errRet := fmt.Errorf("Unable to find user DN: %w", err)
		return nil, nil, errRet
	}

	// Authenticate the user credentials.
	err = conn.Bind(lookupResult.ActualDN, password)
	if err != nil {
		errRet := fmt.Errorf("LDAP auth failed for DN %s: %w", lookupResult.ActualDN, err)
		return nil, nil, errRet
	}

This means Ztunnel will have multiple distinct certificates at a time, one for each unique identity (service account) running on its node.

When fetching certificates, ztunnel will authenticate to the CA with its own identity, but request the identity of another workload.
Critically, the CA must enforce that the ztunnel has permission to request that identity.
Requests for identities not running on the node are rejected.

  @Test
  fun proxyAuthenticateOnConnect() {
    server.useHttps(handshakeCertificates.sslSocketFactory())
    server.enqueue(
      MockResponse(
        code = 407,
        headers = headersOf("Proxy-Authenticate", "Basic realm=\"localhost\""),
        inTunnel = true,
      ),
    )
    server.enqueue(
      MockResponse(inTunnel = true),
    )
    server.enqueue(

  @Test
  fun javaNetAuthenticator() {
    val authenticator = JavaNetAuthenticator()
    val response = Response.Builder().build()
    var request: Request? = authenticator.authenticate(factory.newRoute(), response)
    request = authenticator.authenticate(null, response)
  }

  @Test
  fun javaNetCookieJar() {
    val cookieJar: JavaNetCookieJar = JavaNetCookieJar(newCookieHandler())
    val httpUrl = "".toHttpUrl()

	delta := remoteTime.Sub(localTime)
	if delta < 0 {
		delta *= -1
	}

	if delta > DefaultSkewTime {
		return errSkewedAuthTime
	}

	return nil
}

// IsAuthValid - To authenticate and verify the time difference.
func (s *storageRESTServer) IsAuthValid(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) bool {
	if s.getStorage() == nil {
		s.writeErrorResponse(w, errDiskNotFound)
		return false
	}

        .code(responseCode)
        .body("ABCDE")
        .addHeader("WWW-Authenticate: challenge")
    when (responseCode) {
      HttpURLConnection.HTTP_PROXY_AUTH -> {
        builder.addHeader("Proxy-Authenticate: Basic realm=\"protected area\"")
      }

      HttpURLConnection.HTTP_UNAUTHORIZED -> {
        builder.addHeader("WWW-Authenticate: Basic realm=\"protected area\"")
      }

In diese Exception fügen wir (falls vorhanden) die erforderlichen Scopes als durch Leerzeichen getrennten String ein (unter Verwendung von `scope_str`). Wir fügen diesen String mit den Scopes in den Header `WWW-Authenticate` ein (das ist Teil der Spezifikation).

//// tab | Python 3.10+

```Python hl_lines="105  107-115"
{!> ../../docs_src/security/tutorial005_an_py310.py!}
```

////

//// tab | Python 3.9+

Nesta exceção, nós incluímos os escopos necessários (se houver algum) como uma string separada por espaços (utilizando `scope_str`). Nós colocamos esta string contendo os escopos no cabeçalho `WWW-Authenticate` (isso é parte da especificação).

//// tab | Python 3.10+

```Python hl_lines="106  108-116"
{!> ../../docs_src/security/tutorial005_an_py310.py!}
```

////

//// tab | Python 3.9+

}

func loadRootCredentials() {
	// At this point, either both environment variables
	// are defined or both are not defined.
	// Check both cases and authenticate them if correctly defined
	var user, password string
	var hasCredentials bool
	var legacyCredentials bool
	//nolint:gocritic
	if env.IsSet(config.EnvRootUser) && env.IsSet(config.EnvRootPassword) {

```sh
mc admin policy attach myminio mypolicy --group='cn=projectx,ou=groups,ou=hwengg,dc=min,dc=io'
```

</details>

**Note that by default no policy is set on a user**. Thus even if they successfully authenticate with AD/LDAP credentials, they have no access to object storage as the default access policy is to deny all access.

## API Request Parameters

### LDAPUsername