Smb2QueryDirectoryRequest query = new Smb2QueryDirectoryRequest(th.getConfig());
        query.setFileName(getWildcard());
        create.chain(query);
        Smb2CreateResponse createResp;
        try {
            createResp = th.send(create);
        }
        catch ( SmbException e ) {
            Smb2CreateResponse cr = create.getResponse();

	var data []byte
	if data, err = os.ReadFile(certFile); err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}

	// Trimming leading and tailing white spaces.
	data = bytes.TrimSpace(data)

	// Parse all certs in the chain.
	current := data
	for len(current) > 0 {
		var pemBlock *pem.Block
		if pemBlock, current = pem.Decode(current); pemBlock == nil {

	mux.HandleFunc(pconstants.CNIAddEventPath, s.handleAddEvent)
	return s
}

func (s *CniPluginServer) Stop() {
	s.cniListenServerCancel()
}

// Start starts up a UDS server which receives events from the CNI chain plugin.
func (s *CniPluginServer) Start() error {
	if s.sockAddress == "" {
		return fmt.Errorf("no socket address provided")
	}
	log.Infof("starting listener for CNI plugin events at %v", s.sockAddress)

    val ifNoneMatch = AtomicReference<String?>()
    client =
      client.newBuilder()
        .addNetworkInterceptor(
          Interceptor { chain: Interceptor.Chain ->
            ifNoneMatch.compareAndSet(null, chain.request().header("If-None-Match"))
            chain.proceed(chain.request())
          },
        )
        .build()

    // Confirm the value is cached and intercepted.

   * part of the smeared hash of the element not covered by the hashtable mask, whereas the low bits
   * are the "next" pointer (pointing to the next entry in the bucket chain), which will always be
   * less than or equal to the hashtable mask.
   *
   * <pre>
   * hash  = aaaaaaaa
   * mask  = 00000fff
   * next  = 00000bbb
   * entry = aaaaabbb
   * </pre>
   *

     * a line containing the cipher suite. Next is the length of the peer certificate chain. These
     * certificates are base64-encoded and appear each on their own line. The next line contains the
     * length of the local certificate chain. These certificates are also base64-encoded and appear
     * each on their own line. A length of -1 is used to encode a null array. The last line is

  // Acceptable values are: Unknown, None, Some, NoneOnDryRun
  // Webhooks with side effects MUST implement a reconciliation system, since a request may be
  // rejected by a future step in the admission chain and the side effects therefore need to be undone.
  // Requests with the dryRun attribute will be auto-rejected if they match a webhook with
  // sideEffects == Unknown or Some. Defaults to Unknown.
  // +optional

	// a removal event, and so would never clean up the old IP that we eagerly-added.
	//
	// TODO one place this *can* fail is
	// - if a CNI plugin after us in the chain fails (currently, we are explicitly the last in the chain by design)
	// - the CmdAdd comes back thru here with a new IP
	// - we will never clean up that old IP that we "lost"
	// To fix this we probably need to impl CmdDel + manage our own podUID/IP mapping.

        if (lastEntryIndex == -1) {
          // we need to update the root link from table[]
          tableSet(table, tableIndex, newNext);
        } else {
          // we need to update the link from the chain
          entries[lastEntryIndex] = maskCombine(entries[lastEntryIndex], newNext, mask);
        }

        return entryIndex;
      }
      lastEntryIndex = entryIndex;
      next = getNext(entry, mask);

 * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND,
 * either express or implied. See the License for the specific language
 * governing permissions and limitations under the License.
 */
package org.codelibs.fess.auth.chain;

import static org.codelibs.core.stream.StreamUtil.stream;

import java.io.BufferedReader;
import java.io.File;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.io.InputStream;
import java.io.InputStreamReader;