}
		plaintext, err := KMS.DecryptKey(test.KeyID, ciphertext, test.Context)
		if err != nil {
			t.Fatalf("Test %d: failed to decrypt key: %v", i, err)
		}
		if !bytes.Equal(plaintext, dataKey) {
			t.Fatalf("Test %d: decrypted key does not generated one: got %x - want %x", i, plaintext, dataKey)
		}
	}
}

var decryptKeyTests = []struct {
	KeyID      string
	Plaintext  string
	Ciphertext string

kala
kalau
kalaulah
kalaupun
kalian
kami
kamilah
kamu
kamulah
kan
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kapanpun
dikarenakan
karena
karenanya
ke
kecil
kemudian
kenapa
kepada
kepadanya
ketika
seketika
khususnya
kini
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sekiranya
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lah
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lalu

          ),
      )
    assertThat(okHttpCertificateWithBadSignature.checkSignature(root.keyPair.public)).isFalse()

    // Wrong public key.
    assertThat(okHttpCertificate.checkSignature(certificate.keyPair.public)).isFalse()
  }

  @Test
  fun `EC issuer and signature`() {
    val root =
      HeldCertificate.Builder()
        .certificateAuthority(0)

				t.Errorf("Test case %d: Expected %s but got %s", i+1, tc.expectedErr, err)
			}
			continue
		}

		if tc.keyID != "" && tc.keyID != ssec.KeyID() {
			t.Errorf("Test case %d: Expected bucket encryption KeyID %s but got %s", i+1, tc.keyID, ssec.KeyID())
		}

		if expectedXML, err := xml.Marshal(tc.expectedConfig); err != nil || !bytes.Equal(expectedXML, []byte(tc.inputXML)) {

	}
	return err
}

func (ies *IAMEtcdStore) watch(ctx context.Context, keyPath string) <-chan iamWatchEvent {
	ch := make(chan iamWatchEvent)

	// go routine to read events from the etcd watch channel and send them
	// down `ch`
	go func() {
		for {
		outerLoop:
			watchCh := ies.client.Watch(ctx,
				keyPath, etcd.WithPrefix(), etcd.WithKeysOnly())

			for {
				select {
				case <-ctx.Done():

		Version         = 1
	)
	var (
		header [5]byte
		buffer bytes.Buffer
	)
	json := jsoniter.ConfigCompatibleWithStandardLibrary
	metadata, err := json.Marshal(encryptedObject{
		KeyID:     key.KeyID,
		KMSKey:    key.Ciphertext,
		Algorithm: algorithm,
		Nonce:     nonce,
	})
	if err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}
	if len(metadata) > MaxMetadataSize {

	SSEDAREPackageMetaSize = 32 // 32 bytes

)

// KMSKeyID returns in AWS compatible KMS KeyID() format.
func (o *ObjectInfo) KMSKeyID() string { return kmsKeyIDFromMetadata(o.UserDefined) }

// KMSKeyID returns in AWS compatible KMS KeyID() format.
func (o *MultipartInfo) KMSKeyID() string { return kmsKeyIDFromMetadata(o.UserDefined) }

        .commonName("pinned intermediate")
        .signedBy(pinnedRoot)
        .build()
    val attackerSwitch =
      HeldCertificate.Builder()
        .serialNumber(5L)
        .keyPair(attackerIntermediate.keyPair) // share keys between compromised CA and leaf!
        .commonName("attacker")
        .addSubjectAlternativeName("attacker.com")
        .signedBy(pinnedIntermediate)
        .build()

	usersPrefix := strings.HasPrefix(event.keyPath, iamConfigUsersPrefix)
	groupsPrefix := strings.HasPrefix(event.keyPath, iamConfigGroupsPrefix)
	stsPrefix := strings.HasPrefix(event.keyPath, iamConfigSTSPrefix)
	svcPrefix := strings.HasPrefix(event.keyPath, iamConfigServiceAccountsPrefix)
	policyPrefix := strings.HasPrefix(event.keyPath, iamConfigPoliciesPrefix)

	if GlobalKMS == nil {
		return nil, errKMSNotConfigured
	}
	keyID, kmsKey, sealedKey, err := crypto.S3.ParseMetadata(meta)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}
	extKey, err := GlobalKMS.DecryptKey(keyID, kmsKey, kmsContext)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}
	var objectKey crypto.ObjectKey