When `True` (the default), requests with a body that do not include
                a `Content-Type` header will **not** be parsed as JSON.

                This prevents potential cross-site request forgery (CSRF) attacks
                that exploit the browser's ability to send requests without a
                Content-Type header, bypassing CORS preflight checks. In particular

## 0.109.1 (2024-02-03)

### Security fixes

* ⬆️ Upgrade minimum version of `python-multipart` to `>=0.0.7` to fix a vulnerability when using form data with a ReDos attack. You can also simply upgrade `python-multipart`.

Read more in the [advisory: Content-Type Header ReDoS](https://github.com/tiangolo/fastapi/security/advisories/GHSA-qf9m-vfgh-m389).

### Features

17EA..17EF    ; disallowed                             # NA   <reserved-17EA>..<reserved-17EF>
17F0..17F9    ; valid                  ;      ; NV8    # 4.0  KHMER SYMBOL LEK ATTAK SON..KHMER SYMBOL LEK ATTAK PRAM-BUON
17FA..17FF    ; disallowed                             # NA   <reserved-17FA>..<reserved-17FF>
1800..1805    ; valid                  ;      ; NV8    # 3.0  MONGOLIAN BIRGA..MONGOLIAN FOUR DOTS

constanttime.ByteEq(em[0], 0) seed := em[1 : hash.Size()+1] db := em[hash.Size()+1:] mgf1XOR(seed, mgfHash, db) mgf1XOR(db, mgfHash, seed) lHash2 := db[0:hash.Size()] // We have to validate the plaintext in constant time in order to avoid // attacks like: J. Manger. A Chosen Ciphertext Attack on RSA Optimal // Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) as Standardized in PKCS #1 // v2.0. In J. Kilian, editor, Advances in Cryptology. lHash2Good := subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(lHash, lHash2) // The remainder of the plaintext...

q(em[0], 0) seed := em[1 : hash.Size()+1] db := em[hash.Size()+1:] mgf1XOR(seed, mgfHash, db) mgf1XOR(db, mgfHash, seed) lHash2 := db[0:hash.Size()] // We have to validate the plaintext in constant time in order to avoid // attacks like: J. Manger. A Chosen Ciphertext Attack on RSA Optimal // Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) as Standardized in PKCS #1 // v2.0. In J. Kilian, editor, Advances in Cryptology. lHash2Good := subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(lHash, lHash2) // The remainder of the plaintext...

pkg math, func Acosh(float64) float64
pkg math, func Asin(float64) float64
pkg math, func Asinh(float64) float64
pkg math, func Atan(float64) float64
pkg math, func Atan2(float64, float64) float64
pkg math, func Atanh(float64) float64
pkg math, func Cbrt(float64) float64
pkg math, func Ceil(float64) float64
pkg math, func Copysign(float64, float64) float64
pkg math, func Cos(float64) float64
pkg math, func Cosh(float64) float64