byte[] data = new byte[] { 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 };
        InputStream in = new ByteArrayInputStream(concat(messageHeader(5), data));
        SocketInputStream sis = new SocketInputStream(in);

        // Read in chunks
        byte[] buffer = new byte[10];

        // The read will either:
        // 1. Successfully read all 5 bytes
        // 2. Throw IOException if it tries to read past the message
        try {

	return nil
}

// Now, we read one chunk from the underlying reader.
// A chunk has the following format:
//
//	<chunk-size-as-hex> + ";chunk-signature=" + <signature-as-hex> + "\r\n" + <payload> + "\r\n"
//
// First, we read the chunk size but fail if it is larger
// than 16 MiB. We must not accept arbitrary large chunks.
// One 16 MiB is a reasonable max limit.
//

   */
  protected abstract char @Nullable [] escape(int cp);

  /**
   * Returns the escaped form of a given literal string.
   *
   * <p>If you are escaping input in arbitrary successive chunks, then it is not generally safe to
   * use this method. If an input string ends with an unmatched high surrogate character, then this
   * method will throw {@link IllegalArgumentException}. You should ensure your input is valid <a

    Crc32cHasher() {
      super(16);
    }

    private boolean finished = false;

    /*
     * This trick allows us to avoid having separate states for "first four ints" and "all other
     * four int chunks."  The state we want after the first four bytes is
     *
     * crc0 = ~int0
     * crc1 = int1
     * crc2 = int2
     * crc3 = int3
     *

			f.Modified = modified.In(timeZone(msdosModified.Sub(modified)))
		}
	}

	// Assume that uncompressed size 2³²-1 could plausibly happen in
	// an old zip32 file that was sharding inputs into the largest chunks
	// possible (or is just malicious; search the web for 42.zip).
	// If needUSize is true still, it means we didn't see a zip64 extension.
	// As long as the compressed size is not also 2³²-1 (implausible)

			accessKey:          credentials.AccessKey,
			secretKey:          credentials.SecretKey,
			shouldPass:         false,
			fault:              malformedEncoding,
		},
		// Test case - 8
		// Chunk with shorter than advertised chunk data.
		{
			bucketName:         bucketName,
			objectName:         objectName,
			data:               oneKData,
			dataLen:            1024,
			chunkSize:          1024,

		panic("bytes: Repeat output length overflow")
	}
	n := int(lo) // lo = len(b) * count

	if len(b) == 0 {
		return []byte{}
	}

	// Past a certain chunk size it is counterproductive to use
	// larger chunks as the source of the write, as when the source
	// is too large we are basically just thrashing the CPU D-cache.
	// So if the result length is larger than an empirically-found

            // Given
            SrvCopychunk chunk1 = new SrvCopychunk(100, 200, 300);
            SrvCopychunk chunk2 = new SrvCopychunk(400, 500, 600);
            SrvCopychunk chunk3 = new SrvCopychunk(700, 800, 900);
            byte[] buffer = new byte[EXPECTED_SIZE * 3];

            // When
            int offset1 = chunk1.encode(buffer, 0);
            int offset2 = chunk2.encode(buffer, offset1);

		return err
	}
	return nil
}

// restoreTransitionedObject for multipart object chunks the file stream from remote tier into the same number of parts
// as in the xl.meta for this version and rehydrates the part.n into the fi.DataDir for this version as in the xl.meta

    ByteSource source = out.asByteSource();
    int chunk1 = min(dataSize, fileThreshold);
    int chunk2 = dataSize - chunk1;

    // Write just enough to not trip the threshold
    if (chunk1 > 0) {
      write(out, data, 0, chunk1, singleByte);
      assertTrue(ByteSource.wrap(data).slice(0, chunk1).contentEquals(source));
    }
    File file = out.getFile();
    assertThat(file).isNull();