// doesn't wait forever but instead returns if it cannot
// acquire a write lock.
func TryLockedOpenFile(path string, flag int, perm os.FileMode) (*LockedFile, error) {
	return lockedOpenFile(path, flag, perm, syscall.LOCK_NB)
}

// LockedOpenFile - initializes a new lock and protects
// the file from concurrent access across mount points.
// This implementation doesn't support all the open

	if lkFile == nil {
		return nil, os.ErrInvalid
	}

	return &RLockedFile{
		LockedFile: lkFile,
		refs:       1,
	}, nil
}

// RLockedOpenFile - returns a wrapped read locked file, if the file
// doesn't exist at path returns an error.
func RLockedOpenFile(path string) (*RLockedFile, error) {
	lkFile, err := LockedOpenFile(path, os.O_RDONLY, 0o666)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}

	return newRLockedFile(lkFile)

  if [[ ! -f $MINIO_ACCESSKEY_SECRETKEY_TMP ]];then
    echo "credentials file does not exist"
    return 1
  fi
  if [[ $(cat $MINIO_ACCESSKEY_SECRETKEY_TMP|wc -l) -ne 2 ]];then
    echo "credentials file is invalid"
    rm -f $MINIO_ACCESSKEY_SECRETKEY_TMP
    return 1
  fi
  SVCACCT=$(head -1 $MINIO_ACCESSKEY_SECRETKEY_TMP)
  # Create the svcacct if it does not exist
  if ! checkSvcacctExists ; then
    echo "Creating svcacct '$SVCACCT'"

		if strings.HasPrefix(mpath, ppath) {
			// At this point if the mount point has a common prefix two conditions can happen.
			// - mount.Path matches exact with `path` means we can proceed no error here.
			// - mount.Path doesn't match (means cross-device mount), should error out.
			if mount.Path != path {
				crossMounts = append(crossMounts, mount)
			}
		}
	}

	// other fields such as expiry etc.
	return claims.Valid()
}

// ParseUnverifiedStandardClaims - WARNING: Don't use this method unless you know what you're doing
//
// This method parses the token but doesn't validate the signature. It's only
// ever useful in cases where you know the signature is valid (because it has
// been checked previously in the stack) and you want to extract values from
// it.

			//
			// So it safe to assume that '100-continue' is what would
			// be sent, for the time being keep this work around.
			// Adding a *TODO* to remove this later when Golang server
			// doesn't filter out the 'Expect' header.
			extractedSignedHeaders.Set(header, "100-continue")
		case "host":
			// Go http server removes "host" from Request.Header
			extractedSignedHeaders.Set(header, r.Host)

		// Key which doesn't start with user/user1/filename

// error returned when temporary account is not found
var errNoSuchTempAccount = errors.New("Specified temporary account does not exist")

// error returned in IAM subsystem when an account doesn't exist.
var errNoSuchAccount = errors.New("Specified account does not exist")

// error returned in IAM subsystem when groups doesn't exist.

	config.Net.TLS.Config.ClientAuth = args.TLS.ClientAuth
	config.Net.TLS.Config.RootCAs = args.TLS.RootCAs

	// These settings are needed to ensure that kafka client doesn't hang on brokers
	// refer https://github.com/IBM/sarama/issues/765#issuecomment-254333355
	config.Producer.Retry.Max = 2
	config.Producer.Retry.Backoff = (1 * time.Second)
	config.Producer.Return.Successes = true

	echo "BUG: Etag: '${rep_obj1_etag}' of replicated object: 'minio2/test-bucket/encrypted' doesn't match with source value: '${src_obj1_etag}'"
	exit_1
fi
if [ "${rep_obj1_size}" != "${src_obj1_size}" ]; then
	echo "BUG: Size: '${rep_obj1_size}' of replicated object: 'minio2/test-bucket/encrypted' doesn't match with source value: '${src_obj1_size}'"
	exit_1
fi
if [ "${rep_obj2_etag}" != "${src_obj2_etag}" ]; then