}
    }
  }

  /**
   * Not checking the CA bit created a vulnerability in old OkHttp releases. It is exploited by
   * triggering different chains to be discovered by the TLS engine and our chain cleaner. In this
   * attack there's several different chains.
   *
   *
   * The victim's gets a non-CA certificate signed by a CA, and pins the CA root and/or
   * intermediate. This is business as usual.
   *

        .commonName("root")
        .addSubjectAlternativeName("root_ca.com")
        .build()
    serverIntermediateCa =
      HeldCertificate.Builder()
        .signedBy(serverRootCa)
        .certificateAuthority(0)
        .serialNumber(2L)
        .commonName("intermediate_ca")
        .addSubjectAlternativeName("intermediate_ca.com")
        .build()
    serverCert =
      HeldCertificate.Builder()

      val trustedCert = trustRootIndex.findByIssuerAndSignature(toVerify)
      if (trustedCert != null) {
        if (result.size > 1 || toVerify != trustedCert) {
          result.add(trustedCert)
        }
        if (verifySignature(trustedCert, trustedCert, result.size - 2)) {
          return result // The self-signed cert is a root CA. We're done.
        }

 * certificate is signed by the certificate that follows, and the last certificate is a trusted CA
 * certificate.
 *
 * Use of the chain cleaner is necessary to omit unexpected certificates that aren't relevant to
 * the TLS handshake and to extract the trusted CA certificate for the benefit of certificate
 * pinning.
 */
abstract class CertificateChainCleaner {

FROM golang:1.21-alpine as build

ARG TARGETARCH
ARG RELEASE

ENV GOPATH /go
ENV CGO_ENABLED 0

# Install curl and minisign
RUN apk add -U --no-cache ca-certificates && \
    apk add -U --no-cache curl && \
    go install aead.dev/minisign/cmd/minisign@v0.2.1

# Download minio binary and signature file
RUN curl -s -q https://dl.min.io/server/minio/hotfixes/linux-${TARGETARCH}/archive/minio.${RELEASE} -o /go/bin/minio && \

# hadolint ignore=DL3005,DL3008
RUN apt-get update && \
  apt-get install --no-install-recommends -y \
  ca-certificates \
  curl \
  iptables \
  iproute2 \
  iputils-ping \
  knot-dnsutils \
  netcat-openbsd \
  tcpdump \
  conntrack \
  bsdmainutils \
  net-tools \
  lsof \
  sudo \
  && update-ca-certificates \
  && apt-get upgrade -y \
  && apt-get clean \

      Adapters.BOOLEAN.optional(defaultValue = false),
      Adapters.INTEGER_AS_LONG.optional(),
      decompose = {
        listOf(
          it.ca,
          it.maxIntermediateCas,
        )
      },
      construct = {
        BasicConstraints(
          ca = it[0] as Boolean,
          maxIntermediateCas = it[1] as Long?,
        )
      },
    )

  /**

FROM golang:1.21-alpine as build

ARG TARGETARCH
ARG RELEASE

ENV GOPATH /go
ENV CGO_ENABLED 0

# Install curl and minisign
RUN apk add -U --no-cache ca-certificates && \
    apk add -U --no-cache curl && \
    go install aead.dev/minisign/cmd/minisign@v0.2.1

# Download minio binary and signature file
RUN curl -s -q https://dl.min.io/server/minio/release/linux-${TARGETARCH}/archive/minio.${RELEASE} -o /go/bin/minio && \

When fetching certificates, ztunnel will authenticate to the CA with its own identity, but request the identity of another workload.
Critically, the CA must enforce that the ztunnel has permission to request that identity.
Requests for identities not running on the node are rejected.
This is critical to ensure that a compromised node does not compromise the entire mesh.

FROM golang:1.21-alpine as build

ARG TARGETARCH
ARG RELEASE

ENV GOPATH /go
ENV CGO_ENABLED 0

# Install curl and minisign
RUN apk add -U --no-cache ca-certificates && \
    apk add -U --no-cache curl && \
    go install aead.dev/minisign/cmd/minisign@v0.2.1

# Download minio binary and signature file
RUN curl -s -q https://dl.min.io/server/minio/release/linux-${TARGETARCH}/archive/minio.${RELEASE}.fips -o /go/bin/minio && \