don't correspond to an actual file or directory on the filesystem. The list of
such paths is stored in the packages_for_skip variable and will be skipped
during the test.

##### How to Build

```
bazel build //:test_import_api_packages
```

##### How to Run

```
bazel test //:test_import_api_packages --test_output=all

```

To specify the file via a Bazel command argument, use the following:

```
--repo_env=REQUIREMENTS_FILE_NAME=my_requirements.in
```

### How to run the updater

```
bash updater.sh
```

## How to add a new Python version

Note: Updating the
[rules-python](https://github.com/bazelbuild/rules_python/releases) version may
be required before going through the steps below. This is due to the new Python

2)  Reference [TensorFlow Lite Model Colab](https://colab.research.google.com/gist/ymodak/0dfeb28255e189c5c48d9093f296e9a8/tensorflow-lite-debugger-colab.ipynb): Demonstrate how to convert your TF model to a TF Lite model (with quantization, if used) and run TFLite Inference (if possible).

```

-   Different Python versions
-   Linux, MacOS, and Windows machines (these pool definitions are internal)
-   x86 and arm64
-   CPU-only, or with NVIDIA CUDA support (Linux only), or with TPUs

## How to Test Your Changes to TensorFlow

You may check how your changes will affect TensorFlow by:

1. Creating a PR and observing the presubmit test results
2. Running the CI scripts locally, as explained below

// APIs specific to Eager modes
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

// Temporary APIs till we figure out how to create scalar valued Eager
// tensors and how to get value out of eager abstract tensors.
TF_AbstractTensor* TF_CreateAbstractTensorFromEagerTensor(TFE_TensorHandle* t,
                                                          TF_Status* s);

    how we can reproduce your findings. For memory corruption triggerable in
    TensorFlow models, please demonstrate an exploit against one of Alphabet's
    models in <https://tfhub.dev/>
  - An explanation of who can exploit this vulnerability, and what they gain
    when doing so. Write an attack scenario that demonstrates how your issue

# Checks TFCI_BAZEL_COMMON_ARGS for "gpu" or "cuda", implying that the test is
# relevant. All of the GPU test machines have CUDA installed via other means,
# so I am not sure how to verify that the dependencies themselves are valid for
# the moment.
if [[ "$TFCI_BAZEL_COMMON_ARGS" =~ gpu|cuda ]]; then
  echo "Checking to make sure tensorflow[and-cuda] is installable..."

  TFE_DeleteExecutor(executor);
  if (func) {
    TFE_ContextRemoveFunction(ctx, "MatMulFunction", status);
  }
  TFE_DeleteContext(ctx);

  TF_DeleteStatus(status);

  // TODO(b/136478427): Figure out how to correctly shut the server down.
  worker_server1.release();
  worker_server2.release();

        export TF_WHEEL=$(find /tf/pkg -iname "*.whl")
    fi
}

teardown_file() {
    rm -rf /tf/venv
}

@test "Wheel is manylinux2014 (manylinux_2_17) compliant" {
    python3 -m auditwheel show "$TF_WHEEL" > audit.txt
    grep --quiet -zoP 'is consistent with the following platform tag:\n"manylinux_2_17_(aarch|x86_)64"\.' audit.txt
}

@test "Wheel conforms to upstream size limitations" {

The `_api/v2/api_packages.txt` file is created during the process of generating
TensorFlow API v2 init files and is stored in the wheel file after the build.

See README.md file for "how to run" instruction.
"""

import logging
import unittest
import pkg_resources

logging.basicConfig(level=logging.INFO)


class ImportApiPackagesTest(unittest.TestCase):