injector.discover(ProtoSession.class.getClassLoader());
        Session session = injector.getInstance(Session.class);
        SessionScope scope = new SessionScope();
        scope.enter();
        scope.seed(Session.class, session);
        injector.bindScope(SessionScoped.class, scope);
        return session;
    }

    record Context(Map<String, String> userProperties, Map<String, String> systemProperties) {}

    assertThat(dnsEnd.inetAddressList.size).isEqualTo(1)
  }

  @Test
  fun noDnsLookupOnPooledConnection() {
    server.enqueue(MockResponse())
    server.enqueue(MockResponse())

    // Seed the pool.
    val call1 =
      client.newCall(
        Request.Builder()
          .url(server.url("/"))
          .build(),
      )
    val response1 = call1.execute()

	// we do not need stashbuffer for them.
	if globalBytePoolCap.Load().WidthCap() >= len(readers)*shardSize {
		// Fill buffers
		b = globalBytePoolCap.Load().Get()
		// Seed the buffers.
		for i := range bufs {
			bufs[i] = b[i*shardSize : (i+1)*shardSize]
		}
	}

	return &parallelReader{
		readers:       readers,
		orgReaders:    readers,
		dataBlocks:    e.dataBlocks,

    server.enqueue(MockResponse(body = "seed connection pool"))
    server.enqueue(MockResponse(socketPolicy = DisconnectAfterRequest))
    server.enqueue(MockResponse(body = "unreachable!"))
    client =
      client.newBuilder()
        .dns(DoubleInetAddressDns())
        .retryOnConnectionFailure(false)
        .build()
    executeSynchronously("/").assertBody("seed connection pool")

	stringToSign += scope + "\n"
	canonicalRequestBytes := sha256.Sum256([]byte(canonicalRequest))
	stringToSign += hex.EncodeToString(canonicalRequestBytes[:])
	return stringToSign
}

// getSigningKey hmac seed to calculate final signature.
func getSigningKey(secretKey string, t time.Time, region string, stype serviceType) []byte {
	date := sumHMAC([]byte("AWS4"+secretKey), []byte(t.Format(yyyymmdd)))

        },
        "alphanum_word_filter" : {
          "type" : "alphanum_word",
          "max_token_length" : 20
        },
        "minhash_filter" : {
          "type" : "minhash",
          "seed" : 1,
          "bit" : 2,
          "size" : 64
        },
        "synonym_filter" : {
          "type" : "synonym_graph",
          "synonyms_path": "${fess.dictionary.path}synonym.txt"
        }

  }

  /**
   * Tests equality of {@link Hashing#goodFastHash} instances. This test must be separate from
   * {@link #testSeededHashFunctionEquals} because the parameter to {@code goodFastHash} is a size,
   * not a seed, and because that size is rounded up. Thus, {@code goodFastHash} instances with
   * different parameters can be equal. That fact is a problem for {@code
   * testSeededHashFunctionEquals}.
   */

	// Calculate signature.
	newSignature := getSignature(signingKey, stringToSign)

	return newSignature
}

// calculateSeedSignature - Calculate seed signature in accordance with
//   - http://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/sigv4-streaming.html
//
// returns signature, error otherwise if the signature mismatches or any other
// error while parsing and validating.

    *   Both seeded and unseeded initializers will always generate the same
        values every time they are called (for a given variable shape). For
        unseeded initializers (`seed=None`), a random seed will be created and
        assigned at initializer creation (different initializer instances get
        different seeds).
    *   An unseeded initializer will raise a warning if it is reused (called)

 * randomly ordered data (the probability decreases faster than exponentially in N), but if you are
 * passing in unsanitized user data then a malicious user could force it. A light shuffle of the
 * data using an unpredictable seed should normally be enough to thwart this attack.
 *
 * <p>The time taken to compute multiple quantiles on the same dataset using {@link Scale#indexes