### CVE-2022-3172: Aggregated API server can cause clients to be redirected (SSRF)

A security issue was discovered in kube-apiserver that could allow an attacker controlled aggregated API server to redirect client traffic to any URL.  This could lead to the client performing unexpected actions as well as leaking the client's credentials to third parties. 

/// tip | "Tipp"

/// tip

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   *       directExecutor}, the listener can execute in any of three possible threads:
   *       <ol>
   *         <li>When a thread attaches a listener to a {@code ListenableFuture} that's already
   *             complete, the listener runs immediately in that thread.
   *         <li>When a thread attaches a listener to a {@code ListenableFuture} that's
   *             incomplete and the {@code ListenableFuture} later completes normally, the

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Copyright (c) 2019-present Faye Amacker

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copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is

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[rf]: https://reneefrench.blogspot.com/

 *
 * ```java
 * String attack = "http://example.com/static/images/../../../../../etc/passwd";
 * System.out.println(new URL(attack).getPath());
 * System.out.println(new URI(attack).getPath());
 * System.out.println(HttpUrl.parse(attack).encodedPath());
 * ```
 *
 * By canonicalizing the input paths, they are complicit in directory traversal attacks. Code that
 * checks only the path prefix may suffer!
 *

      description: |
        Provide a [minimal, self-contained example](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minimal_reproducible_example) project demonstrating the problem as a GitHub repository or an attached archive.
        You can use [the template](https://github.com/gradle/gradle-issue-reproducer) with a Gradle GitHub action set up to showcase your problem.

     * 
     * @param type
     * @return session instance with the given type
     */
    <T extends SmbSession> T unwrap ( Class<T> type );


    /**
     * 
     * @return the context this session is attached to
     */
    CIFSContext getContext ();