### CVE-2023-5528: Insufficient input sanitization in in-tree storage plugin leads to privilege escalation on Windows nodes

A security issue was discovered in Kubernetes where a user that can create pods and persistent volumes on Windows nodes may be able to escalate to admin privileges on those nodes. Kubernetes clusters are only affected if they are using an in-tree storage plugin for Windows nodes.

**Affected Versions**:

    // that represent a verification of a specification item needs to be a couple lines at most.
    // The expressions help a lot, but we need a clean to pick up a directory of POMs, automatically load
    // them into a resolver, create the expression to extract the data to validate the Model, and the URI
    // to validate the properties. We also need a way to navigate from the Tex specification documents to

                                You can **read items**.

                                ## Users

                                You will be able to:

                                * **Create users** (_not implemented_).
                                * **Read users** (_not implemented_).

                                """
                )
                ```
                '''
            ),

	var nVersions int // captures all non-free versions

	// Our result
	merged = make([]xlMetaV2ShallowVersion, 0, len(versions[0]))
	tops := make([]xlMetaV2ShallowVersion, len(versions))
	for {
		// Step 1 create slice with all top versions.
		tops = tops[:0]
		var topSig xlMetaV2VersionHeader
		consistent := true // Are all signatures consistent (shortcut)
		for _, vers := range versions {
			if len(vers) == 0 {

				versioned = opts.PrefixEnabledFn(objects[i].ObjectName)
			}
			if versioned || suspended {
				// Bucket is versioned and no version was explicitly
				// mentioned for deletes, create a delete marker instead.
				vr.ModTime = UTCNow()
				vr.Deleted = true
				// Versioning suspended means that we add a `null` version
				// delete marker, if not add a new version for this delete
				// marker.

- Resolve regression in metadata.managedFields handling in create/update/patch requests not using server-side apply ([#91690](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/91690), [@apelisse](https://github.com/apelisse)) [SIG API Machinery and Testing]

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	}

	// Parent user must not be a service account.
	if u, found := cache.iamUsersMap[parentUser]; found && u.Credentials.IsServiceAccount() {
		return updatedAt, fmt.Errorf("%w: unable to create a service account for another service account", errIAMServiceAccountNotAllowed)
	}

	u := newUserIdentity(cred)
	err = store.saveUserIdentity(ctx, u.Credentials.AccessKey, svcUser, u)
	if err != nil {

### CVE-2023-5528: Insufficient input sanitization in in-tree storage plugin leads to privilege escalation on Windows nodes

A security issue was discovered in Kubernetes where a user that can create pods and persistent volumes on Windows nodes may be able to escalate to admin privileges on those nodes. Kubernetes clusters are only affected if they are using an in-tree storage plugin for Windows nodes.

**Affected Versions**:

                )
            self.response_field = create_model_field(
                name=response_name,
                type_=self.response_model,
                mode="serialization",
            )
            # Create a clone of the field, so that a Pydantic submodel is not returned
            # as is just because it's an instance of a subclass of a more limited class