write_to_bazelrc('build --define=%s=%s' % (varname, environ_cp[varname]))


def set_windows_build_flags(environ_cp):
  """Set Windows specific build options."""

  # First available in VS 16.4. Speeds up Windows compile times by a lot. See
  # https://groups.google.com/a/tensorflow.org/d/topic/build/SsW98Eo7l3o/discussion
  # pylint: disable=line-too-long
  write_to_bazelrc(

	}
	c := cap(b.buf)
	if n <= c/2-m {
		// We can slide things down instead of allocating a new
		// slice. We only need m+n <= c to slide, but
		// we instead let capacity get twice as large so we
		// don't spend all our time copying.
		copy(b.buf, b.buf[b.off:])
	} else if c > maxInt-c-n {
		panic(ErrTooLarge)
	} else {
		// Add b.off to account for b.buf[:b.off] being sliced off the front.

  }

  /**
   * Tests equality of {@link Hashing#goodFastHash} instances. This test must be separate from
   * {@link #testSeededHashFunctionEquals} because the parameter to {@code goodFastHash} is a size,
   * not a seed, and because that size is rounded up. Thus, {@code goodFastHash} instances with
   * different parameters can be equal. That fact is a problem for {@code
   * testSeededHashFunctionEquals}.
   */

- Fixes an issue where default RBAC policy could fail to reconcile on API server startup if an error was encountered ([#101954](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/101954), [@voutcn](https://github.com/voutcn)) [SIG Auth]
- Improve speed of vSphere PV provisioning and reduce number of API calls ([#102351](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/102351), [@gnufied](https://github.com/gnufied)) [SIG Cloud Provider and Storage]

	// Calculate signature.
	newSignature := getSignature(signingKey, stringToSign)

	return newSignature
}

// calculateSeedSignature - Calculate seed signature in accordance with
//   - http://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/sigv4-streaming.html
//
// returns signature, error otherwise if the signature mismatches or any other
// error while parsing and validating.

      totalCount += count;
      return this;
    }

    AvlNode<E> add(
        Comparator<? super E> comparator, @ParametricNullness E e, int count, int[] result) {
      /*
       * It speeds things up considerably to unconditionally add count to totalCount here,
       * but that destroys failure atomicity in the case of count overflow. =(
       */
      int cmp = comparator.compare(e, getElement());

pkg math/rand, method (*Rand) Perm(int) []int
pkg math/rand, method (*Rand) Seed(int64)
pkg math/rand, method (*Rand) Uint32() uint32
pkg math/rand, method (*Zipf) Uint64() uint64
pkg math/rand, type Rand struct
pkg math/rand, type Source interface { Int63, Seed }
pkg math/rand, type Source interface, Int63() int64
pkg math/rand, type Source interface, Seed(int64)
pkg math/rand, type Zipf struct

     */
    // NB: yes, this is surprisingly high, but that's what the experiments said was necessary
    // Raising this number slows the worst-case contains behavior, speeds up hashFloodingDetected,
    // and reduces the false-positive probability.
    static final int MAX_RUN_MULTIPLIER = 13;

    /**

# ----------------------------------------------------------
#                                                    Suggest
#                                                     ------

# Seed value for popular word suggestion.
suggest.popular.word.seed=0
# Tags for popular word suggestion.
suggest.popular.word.tags=
# Fields for popular word suggestion.
suggest.popular.word.fields=
# Excluded words for popular word suggestion.

 * randomly ordered data (the probability decreases faster than exponentially in N), but if you are
 * passing in unsanitized user data then a malicious user could force it. A light shuffle of the
 * data using an unpredictable seed should normally be enough to thwart this attack.
 *
 * <p>The time taken to compute multiple quantiles on the same dataset using {@link Scale#indexes