- `inputS3Url` – A presigned URL that the Lambda function can use to download the original object. By using a presigned URL, the Lambda function doesn't need to have MinIO credentials to retrieve the original object. This allows Lambda function to focus on transformation of the object instead of securing the credentials.

	if len(authFields) != 2 {
		return auth.Credentials{}, false, ErrMissingFields
	}

	// Then will be splitting on ":", this will separate `AWSAccessKeyId` and `Signature` string.
	keySignFields := strings.Split(strings.TrimSpace(authFields[1]), ":")
	if len(keySignFields) != 2 {
		return auth.Credentials{}, false, ErrMissingFields
	}

	return checkKeyValid(r, keySignFields[0])
}

   to use a memory-hard function (Argon2) that (on purpose) consumes a lot of memory and CPU.
   The new KMS-based approach can use a key derivation function that is orders of magnitudes
   cheaper w.r.t. memory and CPU.
- Root credentials can now be changed easily. Before, a two-step process was required to
   change the cluster root credentials since they were used to en/decrypt the IAM data.

 *
 * ```java
 * if (response.request().header("Authorization") != null) {
 *   return null; // Give up, we've already failed to authenticate.
 * }
 *
 * String credential = Credentials.basic(...)
 * return response.request().newBuilder()
 *     .header("Authorization", credential)
 *     .build();
 * ```
 *
 * When reactive authentication is requested by a proxy server, the response code is 407 and the

 */
package jcifs.smb;


/**
 * @author mbechler
 *
 */
public interface SmbRenewableCredentials extends CredentialsInternal {

    /**
     * Renew the credentials
     * 
     * @return the renewed credentials
     */
    CredentialsInternal renew ();

createSvcacct () {
  USER=$1
  FILENAME=$2
  #check accessKey_and_secretKey_tmp file
  if [[ ! -f $MINIO_ACCESSKEY_SECRETKEY_TMP ]];then
    echo "credentials file does not exist"
    return 1
  fi
  if [[ $(cat $MINIO_ACCESSKEY_SECRETKEY_TMP|wc -l) -ne 2 ]];then
    echo "credentials file is invalid"
    rm -f $MINIO_ACCESSKEY_SECRETKEY_TMP
    return 1
  fi
  SVCACCT=$(head -1 $MINIO_ACCESSKEY_SECRETKEY_TMP)

# createUser ($policy)
createUser() {
  POLICY=$1
  #check accessKey_and_secretKey_tmp file
  if [[ ! -f $MINIO_ACCESSKEY_SECRETKEY_TMP ]];then
    echo "credentials file does not exist"
    return 1
  fi
  if [[ $(cat $MINIO_ACCESSKEY_SECRETKEY_TMP|wc -l) -ne 2 ]];then
    echo "credentials file is invalid"
    rm -f $MINIO_ACCESSKEY_SECRETKEY_TMP
    return 1
  fi
  USER=$(head -1 $MINIO_ACCESSKEY_SECRETKEY_TMP)

Para lidar com isso, primeiramente nós convertemos o `username` e o `password` para `bytes`, codificando-os com UTF-8.

Então nós podemos utilizar o `secrets.compare_digest()` para garantir que o `credentials.username` é `"stanleyjobson"`, e que o `credentials.password` é `"swordfish"`.

//// tab | Python 3.9+

```Python hl_lines="1  12-24"
{!> ../../docs_src/security/tutorial007_an_py39.py!}
```

////

//// tab | Python 3.8+

		u, ok, err := globalIAMSys.CheckKey(r.Context(), accessKey)
		if err != nil {
			return auth.Credentials{}, false, ErrIAMNotInitialized
		}
		if !ok {
			// Credentials could be valid but disabled - return a different
			// error in such a scenario.
			if u.Credentials.Status == auth.AccountOff {
				return cred, false, ErrAccessKeyDisabled
			}
			return cred, false, ErrInvalidAccessKeyID

			if u.Credentials.IsTemp() {
				// We should delete such that the client can re-request
				// for the expiring credentials.
				deleteKeyEtcd(ctx, ies.client, getUserIdentityPath(user, userType))
				deleteKeyEtcd(ctx, ies.client, getMappedPolicyPath(user, userType, false))
			}
			return nil
		}
		u.Credentials.Claims = jwtClaims.Map()
	}
	if u.Credentials.Description == "" {