### CVE-2022-3162: Unauthorized read of Custom Resources

A security issue was discovered in Kubernetes where users authorized to list or watch one type of namespaced custom resource cluster-wide can read custom resources of a different type in the same API group they are not authorized to read.

**Affected Versions**:
  - kube-apiserver v1.25.0 - v1.25.3

                case 2:
                    segmentation = values[1];
                case 1:
                    token = values[0];
                default:
                    break;
                }

                id++;
                final KuromojiItem item = new KuromojiItem(id, token, segmentation, reading, pos);
                if (updater != null) {

        for (StackTraceElement element : stackTrace) {
            if (element.getMethodName().equals("test_stackTrace_isPresent")) {
                foundTestMethod = true;
                break;
            }
        }
        assertTrue(foundTestMethod);
    }

    @Test
    public void test_toString_containsClassNameAndMessage() {
        // Test toString() method output

        String scrollId = jsonPath.getString("_scroll_id");
        while (true) {
            List<String> resultIds = jsonPath.getList("hits.hits._id");
            if (resultIds.size() == 0) {
                break;
            }
            docIds.addAll(resultIds);
            Map<String, Object> scrollBody = new HashMap<>();
            scrollBody.put("scroll", "1m");
            scrollBody.put("scroll_id", scrollId);

  @SuppressWarnings("InfiniteLoopStatement")
  @Override
  public void run() {
    while (true) {
      try {
        if (!cleanUp(queue.remove())) {
          break;
        }
      } catch (InterruptedException e) {
        // ignore
      }
    }
  }

  /**
   * Cleans up the given reference and any other references already in the queue. Catches and logs

        override fun getInputStream(): InputStream {
          return object : FilterInputStream(super.inputStream) {
            override fun read(
              b: ByteArray?,
              off: Int,
              len: Int,
            ): Int {
              onRead()
              return super.read(b, off, len)
            }
          }
        }

        override fun getOutputStream(): OutputStream =

    - [Container Images](#container-images-17)
  - [Changelog since v1.32.0-alpha.3](#changelog-since-v1320-alpha3)
  - [Urgent Upgrade Notes](#urgent-upgrade-notes-1)
    - [(No, really, you MUST read this before you upgrade)](#no-really-you-must-read-this-before-you-upgrade)
  - [Changes by Kind](#changes-by-kind-16)
    - [Deprecation](#deprecation-1)
    - [API Change](#api-change-5)
    - [Feature](#feature-12)

 * blast radius possible. If an HTTP/2 stream is active, canceling will cancel that stream but not
 * the other streams sharing its connection. But if the TLS handshake is still in progress then
 * canceling may break the entire connection.
 */
class RealCall(
  val client: OkHttpClient,
  /** The application's original request unadulterated by redirects or auth headers. */
  val originalRequest: Request,
  val forWebSocket: Boolean,

        for (Range<Integer> other : mutable.asRanges()) {
          if (other.isConnected(range) && !other.intersection(range).isEmpty()) {
            overlaps = true;
            anyOverlaps = true;
            break;
          }
        }

        try {
          ImmutableRangeSet<Integer> unused = builder.add(range).build();
          assertFalse(overlaps);
          mutable.add(range);

   *
   * ```java
   * // ensure the response (and underlying response body) is closed
   * try (Response response = client.newCall(request).execute()) {
   *   ...
   * }
   * ```
   *
   * The caller may read the response body with the response's [Response.body] method. To avoid
   * leaking resources callers must [close the response body][ResponseBody] or the response.
   *