<T> void set(@Nonnull Key<T> key, @Nullable T value);

    /**
     * Associates the specified session data with the given key if the key is currently mapped to the given value. This
     * method provides an atomic compare-and-update of some key's value.
     *
     * @param key the key under which to store the session data, must not be {@code null}
     * @param oldValue the expected data currently associated with the key, may be {@code null}

  return ops::Mul(ctx, inputs[0], inputs[1], &outputs[0], "Mul");
}

// TODO(vnvo2409): Add more tests from `python/ops/gradient_checker_v2_test.py`.
// These tests should not be confused with `[*]_grad_test` which compare the
// result of `gradient_checker` and `[*]_grad`. The tests here test the
// functionality of `gradient_checker` by comparing the result with expected
// manual user-provided gradients.
class GradientCheckerTest

 * "The .NET Developer's Guide to Windows Security" (which is also
 * available online).
 * <p>
 * Direct ACEs are evaluated first in order. The SID of the user performing
 * the operation and the desired access bits are compared to the SID
 * and access mask of each ACE. If the SID matches, the allow/deny flags
 * and access mask are considered. If the ACE is a "deny"
 * ACE and <i>any</i> of the desired access bits match bits in the access

	request.Header.Set("If-Modified-Since", t.Add(10*time.Minute).UTC().Format(http.TimeFormat))
	response, err = s.client.Do(request)
	c.Assert(err, nil)
	// Since the "If-Modified-Since" header was ahead in time compared to the actual
	// modified time of the object expecting the response status to be http.StatusNotModified.
	c.Assert(response.StatusCode, http.StatusNotModified)

	// Again, obtain the object info.

	in := x.afterVersion()
	sz, buf, _ := msgp.ReadMapHeaderBytes(in)
	newKeys := make([][]byte, 0, sz)
	newVals := make([][]byte, 0, sz)
	var removeKey func(s []byte) bool

	// Copy if big number of compares...
	if len(keys) > 5 && sz > 5 {
		mKeys := make(map[string]struct{}, len(keys))
		for _, key := range keys {
			mKeys[key] = struct{}{}
		}
		removeKey = func(s []byte) bool {
			_, ok := mKeys[string(s)]

    if (roundArbitrarilyAsLong == Long.MAX_VALUE) {
      /*
       * For most values, the conversion from roundArbitrarily to roundArbitrarilyAsLong is
       * lossless. In that case we can compare x to roundArbitrarily using Long.compare(x,
       * roundArbitrarilyAsLong). The exception is for values where the conversion to double rounds
       * up to give roundArbitrarily equal to 2^63, so the conversion back to long overflows and

                        }
                    });
                    // Remove duplicates (equal adjacent elements) - a new, un@Incubating type will be here twice, as 2 errors are reported; use stringified JSON to compare
                    // Filtering an array is NOT in place
                    result.acceptedApiChanges = result.acceptedApiChanges.filter((item, pos, ary) => (!pos || (JSON.stringify(item) != JSON.stringify(ary[pos - 1]))));

		assert.Equal(t, actual, expected)
	})

	// Test generate option 'false', should modify webhooks
	testGenerateOption(t, false, func(t *testing.T, actual, expected []admitv1.MutatingWebhook) {
		if err := assert.Compare(actual, expected); err == nil {
			t.Errorf("expected diff between webhooks, got none")
		}
	})

Pour plus de détails, consultez la section [Déploiement](deployment/index.md){.internal-link target=_blank}.

///

## Benchmarks et vitesse

 * "The .NET Developer's Guide to Windows Security" (which is also
 * available online).
 * <p>
 * Direct ACEs are evaluated first in order. The SID of the user performing
 * the operation and the desired access bits are compared to the SID
 * and access mask of each ACE. If the SID matches, the allow/deny flags
 * and access mask are considered. If the ACE is a "deny"
 * ACE and <i>any</i> of the desired access bits match bits in the access