Correspondence.tolerance(ALLOWED_ERROR);

  /**
   * A {@link Correspondence} which accepts either finite values within {@link #ALLOWED_ERROR} of
   * each other or identical non-finite values.
   */
  private static final Correspondence<Double, Double> QUANTILE_CORRESPONDENCE =
      Correspondence.from(
          new BinaryPredicate<Double, Double>() {
            @Override

   * value that are {@linkplain Range#isConnected connected} to this range.
   *
   * <p>The behavior of {@link #get(Comparable) get(k)} after calling this method is identical to
   * the behavior described in {@link #put(Range, Object) put(range, value)}, however the ranges
   * returned from {@link #asMapOfRanges} will be different if there were existing entries which

   * 'affect' a bit(j) in the output if two inputs, identical but for bit(i), will differ at output
   * bit(j) about half the time
   *
   * <p>Funneling is pretty simple to detect. The key idea is to find example keys which
   * unequivocally demonstrate that funneling cannot be occurring. This is done bit-by-bit. For each
   * input bit(i) and output bit(j), two pairs of keys must be found with all bits identical except

    Object[] array = collection.toArray();
    expectArrayContentsAnyOrder(createSamplesArray(), array);
  }

  /**
   * {@link Collection#toArray(Object[])} says: "Note that {@code toArray(new Object[0])} is
   * identical in function to {@code toArray()}."
   *
   * <p>For maximum effect, the collection under test should be created from an element array of a
   * type other than {@code Object[]}.
   */

         * ours. Therefore, we have to be careful about whether we create our own TypeVariable:
         *
         * 2a. If the resolved types are identical to the original types, then we can return the
         * original, identical JDK TypeVariable. By doing so, we sidestep the problem entirely.
         *
         * 2b. If the resolved types are different from the original types, things are trickier. The

        byte[] out14 = new byte[16];
        byte[] out7 = new byte[8];

        // Act
        NtlmUtil.E(key14, data8, out14);
        NtlmUtil.E(key7, data8, out7);

        // Assert: first block identical to single-chunk encryption
        assertArrayEquals(Arrays.copyOfRange(out14, 0, 8), out7);
        // And second block is present and not all zeros

        Boolean result1 = (Boolean) constantTimeMethod.invoke(null, password1, password2);
        Boolean result2 = (Boolean) constantTimeMethod.invoke(null, password1, password3);

        assertTrue(result1, "Identical passwords should be equal");
        assertFalse(result2, "Different passwords should not be equal");
    }

    /**
     * Measure the average time for equals operations.
     */

			if cmp != -1 {
				t.Errorf(`CompareBbigger(%d,%d) = %d`, len, k, cmp)
			}
			b[k] = a[k]
		}
	}
}

func TestEndianBaseCompare(t *testing.T) {
	// This test compares byte slices that are almost identical, except one
	// difference that for some j, a[j]>b[j] and a[j+1]<b[j+1]. If the implementation
	// compares large chunks with wrong endianness, it gets wrong result.
	// no vector register is larger than 512 bytes for now

            assertEquals(orderedDialects[i], SMBUtil.readInt2(buffer, 24 + i * 2));
        }
    }

    @Test
    @DisplayName("Test multiple encode calls produce identical output")
    void testMultipleEncodeCallsIdentical() {
        ValidateNegotiateInfoRequest request =

### Certificate-based authentication

`--sftp=trusted-user-ca-key=...` specifies a file containing public key of certificate authority that is trusted
to sign user certificates for authentication.

Implementation is identical with "TrustedUserCAKeys" setting in OpenSSH server with exception that only one CA
key can be defined.

If a certificate is presented for authentication and has its signing CA key is in this file, then it may be