in handling your report.

Please, provide a detailed explanation of the issue. In particular, outline the type of the security
issue (DoS, authentication bypass, information disclose, ...) and the assumptions you're making (e.g. do
you need access credentials for a successful exploit).

option go_package = "k8s.io/api/certificates/v1alpha1";

// ClusterTrustBundle is a cluster-scoped container for X.509 trust anchors
// (root certificates).
//
// ClusterTrustBundle objects are considered to be readable by any authenticated
// user in the cluster, because they can be mounted by pods using the
// `clusterTrustBundle` projection.  All service accounts have read access to
// ClusterTrustBundles by default.  Users who only have namespace-level access

else
  # The volume mapping flag below shares the user's gcloud credentials, if any,
  # with the container, in case the user has credentials stored there.
  # This would allow Bazel to authenticate for RBE.
  # Note: TF's CI does not have any credentials stored there.
  TFCI_DOCKER_ARGS="$TFCI_DOCKER_ARGS -v $HOME/.config/gcloud:/root/.config/gcloud"

			CipherSuites:             fips.TLSCiphersBackwardCompatible(),
			CurvePreferences:         fips.TLSCurveIDs(),
		}
		// This is only to support client side certificate authentication
		// https://coreos.com/etcd/docs/latest/op-guide/security.html
		etcdClientCertFile := env.Get(EnvEtcdClientCert, kvs.Get(ClientCert))
		etcdClientCertKey := env.Get(EnvEtcdClientCertKey, kvs.Get(ClientCertKey))

type KeycloakProvider struct {
	sync.Mutex

	oeConfig DiscoveryDoc
	client   http.Client
	adminURL string
	realm    string

	// internal value refreshed
	accessToken Token
}

// LoginWithUser authenticates username/password, not needed for Keycloak
func (k *KeycloakProvider) LoginWithUser(username, password string) error {
	return ErrNotImplemented
}

// LoginWithClientID is implemented by Keycloak service account support

labels.menu_label_type=Label
labels.menu_key_match=Key Match
labels.menu_boost_document_rule=Doc Boost
labels.menu_path_mapping=Path Mapping
labels.menu_web_authentication=Web Authentication
labels.menu_file_authentication=File Authentication
labels.menu_request_header=Request Header
labels.menu_duplicate_host=Duplicate Host
labels.menu_user=User
labels.menu_role=Role
labels.menu_group=Group
labels.menu_suggest=Suggest

```
export MINIO_ETCD_ENDPOINTS=http://localhost:2379
minio server /data
```

NOTE: If `etcd` is configured with `Client-to-server authentication with HTTPS client certificates` then you need to use additional envs such as `MINIO_ETCD_CLIENT_CERT` pointing to path to `etcd-client.crt` and `MINIO_ETCD_CLIENT_CERT_KEY` path to `etcd-client.key` .

### 4. Test with MinIO STS API

      }
    }
    return new MacHasher(getMac(prototype.getAlgorithm(), key));
  }

  @Override
  public String toString() {
    return toString;
  }

  /** Hasher that updates a {@link Mac} (message authentication code). */
  private static final class MacHasher extends AbstractByteHasher {
    private final Mac mac;
    private boolean done;

    private MacHasher(Mac mac) {
      this.mac = mac;
    }

- Kube-apiserver can now specify `--authentication-token-webhook-version=v1` or `--authorization-webhook-version=v1` to use `v1` TokenReview and SubjectAccessReview API objects when communicating with authentication and authorization webhooks. ([#84768](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/84768), [@liggitt](https://github.com/liggitt))

	}
}

// GetRoleArn returns the role ARN.
func (p *providerCfg) GetRoleArn() string {
	if p.RolePolicy == "" {
		return ""
	}
	return p.roleArn.String()
}

// UserInfo returns claims for authenticated user from userInfo endpoint.
//
// Some OIDC implementations such as GitLab do not support
// claims as part of the normal oauth2 flow, instead rely
// on service providers making calls to IDP to fetch additional