Tagger: t,
		}
	}
	return wrapReader{
		Reader: wrapped,
	}
}

// A Reader wraps an io.Reader and computes the
// MD5 checksum of the read content as ETag.
//
// Optionally, a Reader can also verify that
// the computed ETag matches an expected value.
// Therefore, it compares both ETags once the
// underlying io.Reader returns io.EOF.
// If the computed ETag does not match the

	flag.StringVar(&prefix, "prefix", "", "Select a prefix")
	flag.BoolVar(&debug, "debug", false, "Prints HTTP network calls to S3 endpoint")
	flag.BoolVar(&versions, "versions", false, "Verify all versions")
	flag.BoolVar(&insecure, "insecure", false, "Disable TLS verification")
	flag.StringVar(&minModTimeStr, "modified-since", "", "Specify a minimum object last modified time, e.g.: 2023-01-02T15:04:05Z")
	flag.Parse()

  // +optional
  optional string token = 1;

  // Audiences is a list of the identifiers that the resource server presented
  // with the token identifies as. Audience-aware token authenticators will
  // verify that the token was intended for at least one of the audiences in
  // this list. If no audiences are provided, the audience will default to the
  // audience of the Kubernetes apiserver.
  // +optional

// metacache contains a tracked cache entry.
type metacache struct {
	// do not re-arrange the struct this struct has been ordered to use less
	// space - if you do so please run https://github.com/orijtech/structslop
	// and verify if your changes are optimal.
	ended        time.Time  `msg:"end"`
	started      time.Time  `msg:"st"`
	lastHandout  time.Time  `msg:"lh"`
	lastUpdate   time.Time  `msg:"u"`
	bucket       string     `msg:"b"`

mc admin config set myminio identity_tls --env
KEY:
identity_tls  enable X.509 TLS certificate SSO support

ARGS:
MINIO_IDENTITY_TLS_SKIP_VERIFY  (on|off)    trust client certificates without verification. Defaults to "off" (verify)
```

The MinIO TLS STS API is disabled by default. However, it can be *enabled* by setting environment variable:

```
export MINIO_IDENTITY_TLS_ENABLE=on
```

## Example

// permanently. The only way to restore the connection is at the xl-sets layer by xlsets.monitorAndConnectEndpoints()
// after verifying format.json
func (client *peerRESTClient) callWithContext(ctx context.Context, method string, values url.Values, body io.Reader, length int64) (respBody io.ReadCloser, err error) {
	if client == nil {

		if err != nil {
			writeCustomErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrInternalError), err.Error(), r.URL)
			return
		}
		writeSuccessResponseJSON(w, resp)
		return
	}

	// 2. Verify that we can indeed decrypt the (encrypted) key
	decryptedKey, err := GlobalKMS.Decrypt(ctx, &kms.DecryptRequest{
		Name:           key.KeyID,
		Ciphertext:     key.Ciphertext,
		AssociatedData: kmsContext,
	})

Output decrypted to inspect.ad2b43d8.zip
```

		switch r.Method {
		case http.MethodHead:
			writeResponse(w, apiErr.HTTPStatusCode, nil, mimeNone)
		case http.MethodGet:
			writeErrorResponse(r.Context(), w, apiErr, r.URL)
		}
		return
	}

	// Verify if KMS is reachable if its configured
	if GlobalKMS != nil {
		ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(r.Context(), time.Minute)
		defer cancel()

  static Thread startThread(Runnable runnable) {
    Thread thread = new Thread(runnable);
    thread.setDaemon(true);
    thread.start();
    return thread;
  }

  /**
   * Generates a test case verifying that calling any enterXxx, tryEnterXxx, or waitForXxx method
   * with a guard that doesn't match the monitor produces an IllegalMonitorStateException.
   */
  private static TestCase generateGuardWithWrongMonitorTestCase(