*
   * <p>To ensure that the created instance obeys its contract, the parameters should satisfy the
   * following constraints. This is the callers responsibility and is not enforced here.
   *
   * <ul>
   *   <li>If {@code count} is 0, {@code mean} may have any finite value (its only usage will be to
   *       get multiplied by 0 to calculate the sum), and the other parameters may have any values

  // from the list. If the deletionTimestamp of the object is non-nil, entries
  // in this list can only be removed.
  // Finalizers may be processed and removed in any order.  Order is NOT enforced
  // because it introduces significant risk of stuck finalizers.
  // finalizers is a shared field, any actor with permission can reorder it.
  // If the finalizer list is processed in order, then this can lead to a situation

request only, if you want to avoid hardcapping. If the kernel does not support
CPU Quota, NodeStatus will contain a warning indicating that CPU Limits cannot
be enforced.

        boolean serverEnableSig = resp.getResponse().isSigningEnabled();
        if ( log.isDebugEnabled() ) {
            log.debug(
                "Signature negotiation enforced " + this.signingEnforced + " (server " + serverRequireSig + ") enabled "
                        + this.getContext().getConfig().isSigningEnabled() + " (server " + serverEnableSig + ")");
        }

	c.assertSvcAccDeletion(ctx, s, userAdmClient, accessKey, bucket)

	// 6. Check that service account **can** be created for some other user.
	// This is possible because the policy enforced in the plugin.
	c.mustCreateSvcAccount(ctx, globalActiveCred.AccessKey, userAdmClient)
}

func (c *check) mustCreateIAMUser(ctx context.Context, admClnt *madmin.AdminClient) madmin.Credentials {
	c.Helper()

    callback.

 *  Fix: Apply call timeouts when connecting duplex calls, web sockets, and server-sent events.
    Once the streams are established no further timeout is enforced.

 *  Fix: Retain the `Route` when a connection is reused on a redirect or other follow-up. This was
    causing some `Authenticator` calls to see a null route when non-null was expected.

    * - Ignore .mount cgroups, fixing dissappearing stats
    * - Fix wc goroutine leak
    * - Update aws-sdk-go dependency to 1.6.10
* PodSecurityPolicy authorization is correctly enforced by the PodSecurityPolicy admission plugin. ([#43489](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/43489), [@liggitt](https://github.com/liggitt))

* Adding loadBalancer services to quota system ([#24247](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/24247), [@sdminonne](https://github.com/sdminonne))
* Enforce --max-pods in kubelet admission; previously was only enforced in scheduler ([#24674](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/24674), [@gmarek](https://github.com/gmarek))

			opts.claims[ldapAttribPrefix+attribKey] = attribValue
		}

		// NOTE: if not using LDAP, then internal IDP or open ID is
		// being used - in the former, group info is enforced when
		// generated credentials are used to make requests, and in the
		// latter, a group notion is not supported.
	}

	newCred, updatedAt, err := globalIAMSys.NewServiceAccount(ctx, targetUser, targetGroups, opts)

This release contains changes that address the following vulnerabilities:

### CVE-2023-2728: Bypassing enforce mountable secrets policy imposed by the ServiceAccount admission plugin