include with deployment or statefulset additionalLabels: [] ## Additional annotations to include with deployment or statefulset additionalAnnotation: [] ## Typically the deployment/statefulset includes checksums of secrets/config, ## So that when these change on a subsequent helm install, the deployment/statefulset ## is restarted. This can result in unnecessary restarts under GitOps tooling such as ## flux, so set to "true" to disable this behaviour. ignoreChartChecksums: false ## Additional arguments...

allowHostPID: false allowHostPorts: false allowPrivilegeEscala: true allowPrivilegedConta: false allowedCapabilities: [] readOnlyRootFilesyst: false defaultAddCapabiliti: [] requiredDropCapabili: - KILL - MKNOD - SETUID - SETGID fsGroup: type: MustRunAs ranges: - max: {{ .Values.securityContext.fsGroup }} min: {{ .Values.securityContext.fsGroup }} runAsUser: type: MustRunAs uid: {{ .Values.securityContext.runAsUser }} seLinuxContext: type: MustRunAs supplementalGroups: type: RunAsAny volumes: - configMap...

allowHostPID: false allowHostPorts: false allowPrivilegeEscala: true allowPrivilegedConta: false allowedCapabilities: [] readOnlyRootFilesyst: false defaultAddCapabiliti: [] requiredDropCapabili: - KILL - MKNOD - SETUID - SETGID fsGroup: type: MustRunAs ranges: - max: {{ .Values.securityContext.fsGroup }} min: {{ .Values.securityContext.fsGroup }} runAsUser: type: MustRunAs uid: {{ .Values.securityContext.runAsUser }} seLinuxContext: type: MustRunAs supplementalGroups: type: RunAsAny volumes: - configMap...

					break OuterLoop
				}
			} else {
				var outputRecord sql.Record
				// We will attempt to reuse the records in the table.
				// The type of these should not change.
				// The queue should always have at least one entry left for this to work.
				outputQueue = outputQueue[:len(outputQueue)+1]
				if t := outputQueue[len(outputQueue)-1]; t != nil {

func getClaimsFromTokenWithSecret(token, secret string) (map[string]interface{}, error) {
	// JWT token for x-amz-security-token is signed with admin
	// secret key, temporary credentials become invalid if
	// server admin credentials change. This is done to ensure
	// that clients cannot decode the token using the temp
	// secret keys and generate an entirely new claim by essentially
	// hijacking the policies. We need to make sure that this is

allowHostPID: false allowHostPorts: false allowPrivilegeEscala: true allowPrivilegedConta: false allowedCapabilities: [] readOnlyRootFilesyst: false defaultAddCapabiliti: [] requiredDropCapabili: - KILL - MKNOD - SETUID - SETGID fsGroup: type: MustRunAs ranges: - max: {{ .Values.securityContext.fsGroup }} min: {{ .Values.securityContext.fsGroup }} runAsUser: type: MustRunAs uid: {{ .Values.securityContext.runAsUser }} seLinuxContext: type: MustRunAs supplementalGroups: type: RunAsAny volumes: - configMap...

allowHostPID: false allowHostPorts: false allowPrivilegeEscala: true allowPrivilegedConta: false allowedCapabilities: [] readOnlyRootFilesyst: false defaultAddCapabiliti: [] requiredDropCapabili: - KILL - MKNOD - SETUID - SETGID fsGroup: type: MustRunAs ranges: - max: {{ .Values.securityContext.fsGroup }} min: {{ .Values.securityContext.fsGroup }} runAsUser: type: MustRunAs uid: {{ .Values.securityContext.runAsUser }} seLinuxContext: type: MustRunAs supplementalGroups: type: RunAsAny volumes: - configMap...

allowHostPID: false allowHostPorts: false allowPrivilegeEscala: true allowPrivilegedConta: false allowedCapabilities: [] readOnlyRootFilesyst: false defaultAddCapabiliti: [] requiredDropCapabili: - KILL - MKNOD - SETUID - SETGID fsGroup: type: MustRunAs ranges: - max: {{ .Values.securityContext.fsGroup }} min: {{ .Values.securityContext.fsGroup }} runAsUser: type: MustRunAs uid: {{ .Values.securityContext.runAsUser }} seLinuxContext: type: MustRunAs supplementalGroups: type: RunAsAny volumes: - configMap...

allowHostPID: false allowHostPorts: false allowPrivilegeEscala: true allowPrivilegedConta: false allowedCapabilities: [] readOnlyRootFilesyst: false defaultAddCapabiliti: [] requiredDropCapabili: - KILL - MKNOD - SETUID - SETGID fsGroup: type: MustRunAs ranges: - max: {{ .Values.securityContext.fsGroup }} min: {{ .Values.securityContext.fsGroup }} runAsUser: type: MustRunAs uid: {{ .Values.securityContext.runAsUser }} seLinuxContext: type: MustRunAs supplementalGroups: type: RunAsAny volumes: - configMap...

	// This is independent of encryption. An encrypted multipart
	// object also has an ETag that is the MD5 of its part ETags.
	// The fact the in case of encryption the ETag of a part is
	// not the MD5 of the part content does not change that.
	var completeETags []etag.ETag
	for _, part := range complMultipartUpload.Parts {
		ETag, err := etag.Parse(part.ETag)
		if err != nil {
			continue
		}
		completeETags = append(completeETags, ETag)