if err != nil {
		return result, toObjectErr(err, bucket, object, uploadID)
	}

	uploadIDPath := er.getUploadIDDir(bucket, object, uploadID)
	if partNumberMarker < 0 {
		partNumberMarker = 0
	}

	// Limit output to maxPartsList.
	if maxParts > maxPartsList {
		maxParts = maxPartsList
	}

	// Populate the result stub.
	result.Bucket = bucket
	result.Object = object
	result.UploadID = uploadID

            final byte[] buf = buffer.array();
            int len;
            int amount = 0;
            while ((len = in.read(buf)) != -1) {
                buffer.limit(len);
                channel.write(buffer, amount);
                buffer.clear();
                amount += len;
            }
            out.flush();
            return amount;

	mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, d.objectEncryptionKey) // derive part encryption key from part ID and object key
	mac.Write(partIDbin[:])
	partEncryptionKey := mac.Sum(nil)

	// Limit the reader, so the decryptor doesn't receive bytes
	// from the next part (different DARE stream)
	encLenToRead := d.parts[d.partIndex].Size - d.partEncRelOffset

	// Start by embedding cluster info.
	if b := getClusterMetaInfo(ctx); len(b) > 0 {
		internalLogIf(ctx, embedFileInZip(zipWriter, "cluster.info", b, 0o600))
	}

	// Profiles can be quite big, so we limit to max 16 concurrent downloads.
	ng := WithNPeersThrottled(len(sys.peerClients), 16)
	var writeMu sync.Mutex
	for i, client := range sys.peerClients {
		if client == nil {
			continue
		}

    gzipSink.close()
    return result
  }

  private fun assertContent(
    expected: String,
    response: Response,
    limit: Int = Int.MAX_VALUE,
  ) {
    assertThat(readAscii(response.body.byteStream(), limit)).isEqualTo(expected)
  }

  private fun newSet(vararg elements: String): Set<String> = setOf(*elements)

  internal enum class TransferKind {
    CHUNKED {

- DRA: CEL expressions using attribute strings exceeded the cost limit because their cost estimation was incomplete. ([#129661...

- Kube-apiserver: fixed a bug returning inconsistent results from list requests which set a field or label selector and set a paging limit ([#94002](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/94002), [@wojtek-t](https://github.com/wojtek-t)) [SIG API Machinery]

- Register/Deregister Targets in chunks for AWS TargetGroup ([#101592](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/101592), [@M00nF1sh](https://github.com/M00nF1sh)) [SIG Cloud Provider]

  
  When `LimitedSwap` is enabled the swap limit would be automatically calculated for
  Burstable QoS pods. For Best-Effort/Guaranteed QoS pods, swap would be disabled.
  
  Containers with memory requests equal to their memory limits also won't have
  swap access, and it is a way to opt-out of swap for a single container.
  
  The formula for the swap limit for Burstable QoS pods is:

  * `--runtime-config=extensions/v1beta1/podsecuritypolicy=true`
* Enable the PodSecurityPolicy admission plugin (which is not enabled by default):
  * `--admission-control=...,PodSecurityPolicy,...`
* Use authorization to limit users' ability to use specific PodSecurityPolicy objects

**What is the impact?**

A user that is authorized to create pods can make use of any existing PodSecurityPolicy, even ones they are not authorized to use.