},
		// Corrupted Base 64 result
		{
			objectName:         "test",
			data:               []byte("Hello, World"),
			expectedRespStatus: http.StatusBadRequest,
			accessKey:          credentials.AccessKey,

                    try {
                        Files.deleteIfExists(handleFile);
                    } catch (IOException deleteEx) {
                        log.error("Failed to delete corrupted handle file: " + handleFile, deleteEx);
                    }
                }
            }
        } catch (IOException e) {

        }
      } finally {
        if (stillRunning) {
          // An Error is bubbling up. We should mark ourselves as no longer running. That way, if
          // anyone tries to keep using us, we won't be corrupted.
          synchronized (PerListenerQueue.this) {
            isThreadScheduled = false;
          }
        }
      }
    }
  }

 * Fix problems where spdy/3.1 headers may not have been compressed properly.
 * Fix problems with spdy/3.1 and http/2 where the wrong window size was being
   used.
 * Fix 1.5.0 regression where conditional cache responses could corrupt the
   connection pool.


## Version 1.5.0

_2014-03-07_


##### OkHttp no longer uses the default SSL context.

Applications that want to use the global SSL context with OkHttp should configure their

	}

	// There are two possibilities:
	// - We use a KMS -> There must be a key ID and a KMS data key.
	// - We use a K/V -> There must be no key ID and no KMS data key.
	// Otherwise, the metadata is corrupted.
	keyID, idPresent := metadata[MetaKeyID]
	b64KMSSealedKey, kmsKeyPresent := metadata[MetaDataEncryptionKey]
	if !idPresent && kmsKeyPresent {

	obj, fsDir, err := prepareFS(ctx)
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatal(err)
	}
	defer os.RemoveAll(fsDir)
	if err = newTestConfig(globalMinioDefaultRegion, obj); err != nil {
		t.Fatal(err)
	}

	// Corrupted XML
	malformedReq := &http.Request{
		Body:          io.NopCloser(bytes.NewReader([]byte("<>"))),
		ContentLength: int64(len("<>")),
	}

	// Not an XML
	badRequest := &http.Request{

            // Verify areas before offset are untouched
            for (int i = 0; i < offset; i++) {
                assertEquals((byte) 0xFF, buffer[i], "Buffer corrupted before offset at position " + i);
            }
        }
    }

		}
		_, buf, err = msgp.ReadBytesZC(buf)
		if err != nil {
			return fmt.Errorf("xlMetaInlineData: %w", err)
		}
	}

	return nil
}

// repair will copy all seemingly valid data entries from a corrupted set.
// This does not ensure that data is correct, but will allow all operations to complete.
func (x *xlMetaInlineData) repair() {
	data := *x
	if len(data) == 0 {
		return
	}

	if !data.versionOK() {

  - A description of the technical details of the vulnerabilities.
  - A minimal example of the vulnerability. It is very important to let us know
    how we can reproduce your findings. For memory corruption triggerable in
    TensorFlow models, please demonstrate an exploit against one of Alphabet's
    models in <https://tfhub.dev/>
  - An explanation of who can exploit this vulnerability, and what they gain

                Arguments.of("name length exceeds remaining", (java.util.function.Supplier<byte[]>) () -> {
                    byte[] buf = buildBuffer(der, nameBytes);
                    // Corrupt NAME_LEN to be larger than actual by +5
                    int i = 2 + 2 + der.length; // index where NAME_LEN starts
                    int fakeLen = nameBytes.length + 5;