* specified through this <tt>jcifs.properties</tt> system property.
     * 
     * @return a global context, initialized on first call
     */
    public static synchronized final SingletonContext getInstance () {
        if ( INSTANCE == null ) {
            try {
                log.debug("Initializing singleton context");
                init(null);

   * being deleted. This can happen if, after checking that a file is a directory (and not a
   * symbolic link), that directory is deleted and replaced by a symbolic link to an outside
   * directory before the call that opens the directory to read its entries. File systems that
   * support {@code SecureDirectoryStream} do not have this vulnerability.
   */
  ALLOW_INSECURE

title %0
@REM enable echoing by setting MAVEN_BATCH_ECHO to 'on'
@if "%MAVEN_BATCH_ECHO%"=="on" echo %MAVEN_BATCH_ECHO%

@setlocal

echo "This script is deprecated for removal, please use 'mvn --debug' instead"

     */
    @Nonnull
    Optional<RemoteRepository> getRepository();

    /**
     * Traverses this node and potentially its children using the specified visitor.
     *
     * @param visitor the visitor to call back, must not be {@code null}
     * @return {@code true} to visit siblings nodes of this node as well, {@code false} to skip siblings
     */
    boolean accept(@Nonnull NodeVisitor visitor);

    /**

// flags and shouldn't be considered as replacement
// for os.OpenFile().
func LockedOpenFile(path string, flag int, perm os.FileMode) (*LockedFile, error) {
	return lockedOpenFile(path, flag, perm, 0)
}

// Open - Call os.OpenFile
func Open(path string, flag int, perm os.FileMode) (*os.File, error) {
	return os.OpenFile(path, flag, perm)

	Spectre    = flag.String("spectre", "", "enable spectre mitigations in `list` (all, ret)")
)

var DebugFlags struct {
	MayMoreStack string `help:"call named function before all stack growth checks"`
	PCTab        string `help:"print named pc-value table\nOne of: pctospadj, pctofile, pctoline, pctoinline, pctopcdata"`
}

var (
	D        MultiFlag
	I        MultiFlag

      .host(InetAddress.getByName(server.hostName).hostAddress)
      .build()
  }

  private operator fun get(url: HttpUrl) {
    val call =
      client.newCall(
        Request.Builder()
          .url(url)
          .build(),
      )
    val response = call.execute()
    response.body.close()
  }

	ctx := newContext(r, w, "AssumeRole")

	claims := stsClaims{}
	defer logger.AuditLog(ctx, w, r, claims)

	// Check auth here (otherwise r.Form will have unexpected values from
	// the call to `parseForm` below), but return failure only after we are
	// able to validate that it is a valid STS request, so that we are able
	// to send an appropriate audit log.
	user, apiErrCode := checkAssumeRoleAuth(ctx, r)

    for (int i = 0; i < nTasks; i++) {
      futures.add(
          threadPool.submit(
              new Callable<Long>() {
                @Override
                public Long call() {
                  long threadSum = 0;
                  for (int j = 0; j < getsPerTask; j++) {
                    long delta = random.nextInt(deltaRange);
                    int behavior = random.nextInt(10);

   * being deleted. This can happen if, after checking that a file is a directory (and not a
   * symbolic link), that directory is deleted and replaced by a symbolic link to an outside
   * directory before the call that opens the directory to read its entries. File systems that
   * support {@code SecureDirectoryStream} do not have this vulnerability.
   */
  ALLOW_INSECURE