//
// The "asymmetric" keyType defines restrictions requiring key payloads to be
// DER encoded X.509 certificates signed by keys in another keyring. Restrictions
// for "asymmetric" include "builtin_trusted", "builtin_and_secondary_trusted",
// "key_or_keyring:<key>", and "key_or_keyring:<key>:chain".
//
// As of Linux 4.12, only the "asymmetric" keyType defines type-specific
// restrictions.
//

	mgf1XOR(db, mgfHash, seed)

	lHash2 := db[0:hash.Size()]

	// We have to validate the plaintext in constant time in order to avoid
	// attacks like: J. Manger. A Chosen Ciphertext Attack on RSA Optimal
	// Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) as Standardized in PKCS #1
	// v2.0. In J. Kilian, editor, Advances in Cryptology.
	lHash2Good := subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(lHash, lHash2)

			"other authentication strategies.")

		fs.StringSliceVar(&o.OIDC.SigningAlgs, oidcSigningAlgsFlag, []string{"RS256"}, ""+
			"Comma-separated list of allowed JOSE asymmetric signing algorithms. JWTs with a "+
			"supported 'alg' header values are: RS256, RS384, RS512, ES256, ES384, ES512, PS256, PS384, PS512. "+
			"Values are defined by RFC 7518 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7518#section-3.1.")

	// but should not underflow in float and in fact is exactly representable.
	fail64("*", mul64_ssa, dtiny, dtiny, 1.9636373861190906e-90)

	// Intended to create register pressure which forces
	// asymmetric op into different code paths.
	aa, ab, ac, ad, ba, bb, bc, bd, ca, cb, cc, cd, da, db, dc, dd := manysub_ssa(1000.0, 100.0, 10.0, 1.0)

	expect64(t, "aa", aa, 11.0)
	expect64(t, "ab", ab, 900.0)

// there isn't such an edge one is created.
func (n *Node) AddToEdgeDiv(to *Node, dv, v int64, residual, inline bool) {
	if n.Out[to] != to.In[n] {
		panic(fmt.Errorf("asymmetric edges %v %v", *n, *to))
	}

	if e := n.Out[to]; e != nil {
		e.WeightDiv += dv
		e.Weight += v
		if residual {
			e.Residual = true
		}
		if !inline {
			e.Inline = false
		}
		return

}

// Checks that legacy path correctly handles asymmetric quantized values.
// LEGACY-LABEL: CheckLegacyQuantizeAdd
func.func @CheckLegacyQuantizeAdd() -> tensor<1x2x!quant.uniform<i8:f32, 0.0078431372549019607:-128>> {

			//
			// The constant x can be rewritten as ADDIS + ADD as follows:
			//     ADDIS $x>>16 + (x>>15)&1, rX, rY
			//     ADD   $int64(int16(x)), rY, rY
			// The range is slightly asymmetric as 0x7FFF8000 and above overflow the sign bit, whereas for
			// negative values, this would happen with constant values between -1 and -32768 which can
			// assemble into a single addi.

// CHECK: return %[[CONV2D]] : tensor<1x3x2x2x!quant.uniform<i8:f32, 4.000000e+00>>

// -----

// Tests static range quantized dot_general with asymmetric quantized input.

func.func @dot_general_upstream_srq_asym_input(%arg0: tensor<1x2x3x4x!quant.uniform<i8:f32, 1.000000e+0:-100>>) -> tensor<1x2x3x5x!quant.uniform<i8:f32, 4.000000e+0>> {

		// The multiply is unsigned for the U versions, signed for the non-U versions.
		// HMULx[U] are intentionally not marked as commutative, even though they are.
		// This is because they have asymmetric register requirements.
		// There are rewrite rules to try to place arguments in preferable slots.
		{name: "HMULQ", argLength: 2, reg: gp21hmul, asm: "IMULQ", clobberFlags: true},

			arg := a
			testFunVV(t, "addVV_novec", addVV_novec, arg)

			arg = argVV{a.z, a.y, a.x, a.c}
			testFunVV(t, "addVV_novec symmetric", addVV_novec, arg)

			arg = argVV{a.x, a.z, a.y, a.c}
			testFunVV(t, "subVV_novec", subVV_novec, arg)

			arg = argVV{a.y, a.z, a.x, a.c}
			testFunVV(t, "subVV_novec symmetric", subVV_novec, arg)
		}
	}