ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
	defer cancel()

	nDisks := 16 // Maximum disks.
	var erasureDisks []string
	for i := 0; i < nDisks; i++ {
		// Do not attempt to create this path, the test validates
		// so that newErasureSets initializes non existing paths
		// and successfully returns initialized object layer.
		disk := filepath.Join(globalTestTmpDir, "minio-"+nextSuffix())
		erasureDisks = append(erasureDisks, disk)

    .build();
```

Client Authentication
---------------------

The above scenario is representative of most TLS set ups: the client uses certificates to validate
the identity of a server. The converse is also possible. Here we create a server that authenticates
a client and a client that authenticates a server.

```java

		}
		if encodingType != testCase.encodingType {
			t.Errorf("Test %d: Expected %s, got %s", i+1, testCase.encodingType, encodingType)
		}
	}
}

// Validates extracting information for object resources.
func TestGetObjectsResources(t *testing.T) {
	testCases := []struct {
		values                     url.Values
		uploadID                   string

  }
  if (remote) {
    TFE_OpSetDevice(matmul, task1_name, status);
    ASSERT_EQ(TF_GetCode(status), TF_OK) << TF_Message(status);
  } else if (!async) {
    // Set the local device to CPU to easily validate mirroring
    string cpu_device_name;
    ASSERT_TRUE(GetDeviceName(ctx, &cpu_device_name, "CPU"));
    TFE_OpSetDevice(matmul, cpu_device_name.c_str(), status);

			[]byte("10000;chunk-signature=ad80c730a21e5b8d04586a2213dd63b9a0e99e0e2307b0ade35a65485a288648    \t \n"),
			[]byte("10000"),
			[]byte("ad80c730a21e5b8d04586a2213dd63b9a0e99e0e2307b0ade35a65485a288648"),
		},
	}
	// Validate chunk extension removal.
	for i, tt := range tests {
		// Extract chunk size and chunk signature after parsing a standard chunk-extension format.
		hexChunkSize, hexChunkSignature := parseS3ChunkExtension(tt.buf)

			if err != nil {
				rpt.SetStatus(bucket, fileName, err)
				continue
			}
			// Validate the received bucket policy document
			if err = bucketLifecycle.Validate(rcfg); err != nil {
				rpt.SetStatus(bucket, fileName, err)
				continue
			}

			// Validate the transition storage ARNs
			if err = validateTransitionTier(bucketLifecycle); err != nil {
				rpt.SetStatus(bucket, fileName, err)

	if err != nil {
		apiErr := errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrMalformedXML)
		apiErr.Description = err.Error()
		writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, apiErr, r.URL)
		return
	}
	// validate the request
	if err := rreq.validate(ctx, objectAPI); err != nil {
		apiErr := errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrMalformedXML)
		apiErr.Description = err.Error()
		writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, apiErr, r.URL)
		return
	}

	defer env.LockSetEnv()()

	// Disable merging env values with config for validation.
	env.SetEnvOff()

	// Enable env values to validate KMS.
	defer env.SetEnvOn()
	if subSys != "" {
		return validateSubSysConfig(ctx, s, subSys, objAPI)
	}

	// No sub-system passed. Validate all of them.
	for _, ss := range config.SubSystems.ToSlice() {
		if err := validateSubSysConfig(ctx, s, ss, objAPI); err != nil {
			return err

type CheckPreconditionFn func(o ObjectInfo) bool

// EvalMetadataFn validates input objInfo and GetObjectInfo error and returns an updated metadata and replication decision if any
type EvalMetadataFn func(o *ObjectInfo, gerr error) (ReplicateDecision, error)

// EvalRetentionBypassFn validates input objInfo and GetObjectInfo error and returns an error if retention bypass is not allowed.

  // +optional
  optional string reclaimPolicy = 4;

  // mountOptions controls the mountOptions for dynamically provisioned PersistentVolumes of this storage class.
  // e.g. ["ro", "soft"]. Not validated -
  // mount of the PVs will simply fail if one is invalid.
  // +optional
  repeated string mountOptions = 5;

  // allowVolumeExpansion shows whether the storage class allow volume expand.
  // +optional