# Stop two nodes
	docker stop resiliency-minio1-1
	docker stop resiliency-minio2-1
	sleep 10

	verify_resiliency_failure "${FUNCNAME[0]}"

	# Restart the nodes
	docker start resiliency-minio1-1
	docker start resiliency-minio2-1

	./mc ready myminio
}

function test_resiliency_success_with_disks_offline() {
	echo

        return index;
    }

    /**
     * Sets the current index position in the buffer.
     *
     * @param index the new index position
     */
    public void setIndex(final int index) {
        this.index = index;
    }

    /**
     * Returns the capacity of the buffer.
     *
     * @return the buffer capacity
     */
    public int getCapacity() {
        return buf.length - start;

        NdrShort decoded = new NdrShort(0);
        decoded.decode(buf);
        assertEquals(123, decoded.value, "decoded value should equal original");
    }

    /**
     * Verify that encode invokes NdrBuffer.enc_ndr_short via a mocked
     * (spied) buffer.
     */
    @Test
    void encodeWithSpiedBufferCallsEncMethod() throws NdrException {
        NdrShort ns = new NdrShort(42);

			path:   kmsVersionPath,
			asRoot: false,

			wantStatusCode: http.StatusForbidden,
			wantResp:       []string{"AccessDenied"},
		},
		{
			name:   "version as user with policy ignores resource want success",
			method: http.MethodGet,
			path:   kmsVersionPath,
			asRoot: false,

			policy: `{"Effect": "Allow",
				"Action": ["kms:Version"],

@Deprecated
public interface GraphConflictResolver {
    String ROLE = GraphConflictResolver.class.getName();

    /**
     * Cleanses the supplied graph by leaving only one directed versioned edge\
     * between any two nodes, if multiple exists. Uses scope relationships, defined
     * in <code>ArtifactScopeEnum</code>
     *
     * @param graph the "dirty" graph to be simplified via conflict resolution

  - Fix an error where existing nodes were not considered as destinations while finding place for pods in scale-down simulations
  - Remove redundant log lines and reduce severity around parsing kubeEnv
  - Don't treat nodes created by virtual kubelet as nodes from non-autoscaled node groups
  - Remove redundant logging around calculating node utilization
  - Add configurable `--network` and `--rm` flags for docker in `Makefile`

    assertThat(unordered.isOrdered()).isFalse();
    assertThat(unordered).containsExactly("node", "node");
    assertThat(unordered.nodeU()).isEqualTo("node");
    assertThat(unordered.nodeV()).isEqualTo("node");
    assertThat(unordered.adjacentNode("node")).isEqualTo("node");
    assertThat(unordered.toString()).isEqualTo("[node, node]");
  }

  @Test

    RuntimeException re = new RuntimeException(iae);
    IllegalStateException ex = new IllegalStateException(re);

    assertThat(getCausalChain(ex)).containsExactly(ex, re, iae, sue).inOrder();
    assertSame(sue, Iterables.getOnlyElement(getCausalChain(sue)));

    List<Throwable> causes = getCausalChain(ex);
    assertThrows(UnsupportedOperationException.class, () -> causes.add(new RuntimeException()));

    table.put("foo", 12, 'b');
    table.put("bar", 5, 'c');
    table.put("cat", 8, 'd');
    assertThat(table.rowKeySet()).containsExactly("foo", "cat", "bar").inOrder();
    assertThat(table.row("foo").keySet()).containsExactly(12, 3).inOrder();
  }

  public void testCreateCopy() {
    TreeBasedTable<String, Integer, Character> original =

### CVE-2023-3676: Insufficient input sanitization on Windows nodes leads to privilege escalation

A security issue was discovered in Kubernetes where a user that can create pods on Windows nodes may be able to escalate to admin privileges on those nodes. Kubernetes clusters are only affected if they include Windows nodes.

**Affected Versions**:
  - kubelet <= v1.28.0
  - kubelet <= v1.27.4