}
	return p.roleArn.String()
}

// UserInfo returns claims for authenticated user from userInfo endpoint.
//
// Some OIDC implementations such as GitLab do not support
// claims as part of the normal oauth2 flow, instead rely
// on service providers making calls to IDP to fetch additional
// claims available from the UserInfo endpoint

        call_counter["count"] += 1
        return f"db_{call_counter['count']}"

    def get_user(db: Annotated[str, Depends(get_db)]):
        return "user"

    app = FastAPI()

    @app.get("/")
    def endpoint(
        db: Annotated[str, Depends(get_db)],
        user: Annotated[str, Security(get_user, scopes=["read"])],
    ):
        return {"db": db}

    return app


@pytest.fixture(name="client")

		domainIPs := set.NewStringSet()
		for _, endpoint := range minioEndpoints {
			if net.ParseIP(endpoint) == nil {
				// Checking if the IP is a DNS entry.
				addrs, err := globalDNSCache.LookupHost(GlobalContext, endpoint)
				if err != nil {
					logger.FatalIf(err, "Unable to initialize MinIO server with [%s] invalid entry found in MINIO_PUBLIC_IPS", endpoint)
				}
				for _, addr := range addrs {

- Fixing issue with Winkernel Proxier - No ingress load balancer rules with endpoints to support load balancing when all the endpoints are terminating. ([#114451](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/114451),...

Cuando `authenticate_user` se llama con un nombre de usuario que no existe en la base de datos, aun así ejecutamos `verify_password` contra un hash ficticio.

Esto asegura que el endpoint tarda aproximadamente la misma cantidad de tiempo en responder tanto si el nombre de usuario es válido como si no, previniendo los **timing attacks** que podrían usarse para enumerar nombres de usuario existentes.

/// note | Nota

Attackers could simply run a script to send requests to your API, no need for browser interaction, so you are probably already securing any privileged endpoints.

In that case **this attack / risk doesn't apply to you**.

This risk and attack is mainly relevant when the app runs on the **local network** and that is the **only assumed protection**.

Atacantes poderiam simplesmente executar um script para enviar requisições à sua API, sem necessidade de interação do navegador, então você provavelmente já está protegendo quaisquer endpoints privilegiados.

Nesse caso, esse ataque/risco não se aplica a você.

Esse risco e ataque é relevante principalmente quando a aplicação roda na rede local e essa é a única proteção presumida.

  @Test
  public void addEdge_orderMismatch() {
    assume().that(graphIsMutable()).isTrue();

    EndpointPair<Integer> endpoints = EndpointPair.unordered(N1, N2);
    IllegalArgumentException e =
        assertThrows(
            IllegalArgumentException.class, () -> networkAsMutableNetwork.addEdge(endpoints, E12));
    assertThat(e).hasMessageThat().contains(ENDPOINTS_MISMATCH);
  }

  @Test

serviceMonitor: enabled: false public: true additionalLabels: {} relabelConfigs: {} # namespace: monitoring # interval: 30s # scrapeTimeout: 10s ## ETCD settings: https://github.com/minio/minio/blob/master/docs/sts/etcd.md ## Define endpoints to enable this section. etcd: endpoints: [] pathPrefix: "" corednsPathPrefix: "" clientCert: "" clientCertKey: "" minio/templates/NOTES.txt {{- if eq .Values.service.type "ClusterIP" "NodePort" }} MinIO can be accessed via port {{ .Values.service.port }} on the following...

 */
package org.codelibs.fess.app.web.api.admin.plugin;

import org.codelibs.fess.app.web.admin.plugin.DeleteForm;

/**
 * Request body class for plugin deletion API endpoint.
 * Extends the standard plugin DeleteForm to provide JSON request body functionality
 * for REST API operations.
 */
public class DeleteBody extends DeleteForm {

    /**
     * Creates a new instance of DeleteBody.