lHash2 := db[0:hash.Size()] // We have to validate the plaintext in constant time in order to avoid // attacks like: J. Manger. A Chosen Ciphertext Attack on RSA Optimal // Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) as Standardized in PKCS #1 // v2.0. In J. Kilian, editor, Advances in Cryptology. lHash2Good := subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(lHash, lHash2) // The remainder of the plaintext must be zero or more 0x00, followed // by 0x01, followed by the message. // lookingForIndex: 1 iff we are still looking for...

pkg debug/elf, const EI_ABIVERSION = 8
pkg debug/elf, const EI_CLASS = 4
pkg debug/elf, const EI_DATA = 5
pkg debug/elf, const EI_NIDENT = 16
pkg debug/elf, const EI_OSABI = 7
pkg debug/elf, const EI_PAD = 9
pkg debug/elf, const EI_VERSION = 6
pkg debug/elf, const ELFCLASS32 = 1
pkg debug/elf, const ELFCLASS64 = 2
pkg debug/elf, const ELFCLASSNONE = 0
pkg debug/elf, const ELFDATA2LSB = 1

lHash2 := db[0:hash.Size()] // We have to validate the plaintext in constant time in order to avoid // attacks like: J. Manger. A Chosen Ciphertext Attack on RSA Optimal // Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) as Standardized in PKCS #1 // v2.0. In J. Kilian, editor, Advances in Cryptology. lHash2Good := subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(lHash, lHash2) // The remainder of the plaintext must be zero or more 0x00, followed // by 0x01, followed by the message. // lookingForIndex: 1 iff we are still looking for...