// server admin credentials change. This is done to ensure
	// that clients cannot decode the token using the temp
	// secret keys and generate an entirely new claim by essentially
	// hijacking the policies. We need to make sure that this is
	// based on admin credential such that token cannot be decoded
	// on the client side and is treated like an opaque value.
	claims, err := auth.ExtractClaims(token, secret)

        SMBUtil.writeInt8(expectedIndexNumber, buffer, bufferIndex);

        // Decode
        int bytesDecoded = fileInternalInfo.decode(buffer, bufferIndex, 8);

        // Verify
        assertEquals(8, bytesDecoded);
        assertEquals(expectedIndexNumber, fileInternalInfo.getIndexNumber());
    }

    @Test
    @DisplayName("Test decode with zero index number")

    /**
     * Creates a Kerberos AP request from a token.
     *
     * @param token the Kerberos AP-REQ token
     * @param keys the Kerberos keys for decryption
     * @throws PACDecodingException if the token cannot be decoded
     */
    public KerberosApRequest(byte[] token, KerberosKey[] keys) throws PACDecodingException {
        this(parseSequence(token), keys);
    }

        // Decode
        fileBothDirectoryInfo.decode(buffer, 0, buffer.length);

        // Verify - the decode method strips null termination, so filename should match
        assertEquals(expectedFilename, fileBothDirectoryInfo.getFilename());
    }

    @Test
    @DisplayName("Test decode with null-terminated non-Unicode filename")

    }

    @Test
    @DisplayName("Test decode with minimum valid length")
    void testDecodeMinimumValidLength() throws SMBProtocolDecodingException {
        // Prepare minimum valid buffer - exactly 24 bytes
        byte[] buffer = new byte[28];
        Arrays.fill(buffer, 0, 24, (byte) 0xAA);

        // Decode with len = 24 (minimum valid)
        int bytesConsumed = response.decode(buffer, 0, 24);

3/aws4_request,SignedHeaders=host;x-amz-content-sha256;x-amz-date;x-amz-decoded-content-length,Signature=d4d6862e6cc61011a61fa801da71048ece4f32a0562cad6bb88bdda50d7fcb95","Content-Length":"401","Content-Type":"application/octet-stream","User-Agent":"MinIO (linux; amd64) minio-go/v7.0.70 mc/RELEASE.2024-04-30T17-44-48Z","X-Amz-Content-Sha256":"STREAMING-AWS4-HMAC-SHA256-PAYLOAD","X-Amz-Date":"20240509T073810Z","X-Amz-Decoded-Content-Length":"228"},"responseHeader":{"Accept-Ranges":"bytes","Conten...

		return 0
	}
	var sameDataDirCount int
	var decoded xlMetaDataDirDecoder
	for _, version := range x.versions {
		if version.header.Type != ObjectType || version.header.VersionID == versionID || !version.header.UsesDataDir() {
			continue
		}
		_, err := decoded.UnmarshalMsg(version.meta)
		if err != nil || decoded.ObjectV2 == nil || decoded.ObjectV2.DataDir != dataDir {
			continue
		}

            // Setup for SamrSamEntry decode chain
            mockDeferredBuffer.deferred = mockDeferredBuffer;
            when(mockDeferredBuffer.dec_ndr_short()).thenReturn(0, 0, 0);

            // When: Decoding output
            message.decode_out(mockNdrBuffer);

            // Then: Should decode all output parameters
            verify(samArray).decode(mockNdrBuffer);

  }

  @Test fun `cannot decode malformed utc time`() {
    val bytes = "170d3139313231362333303231305a".decodeHex()
    assertFailsWith<ProtocolException> {
      Adapters.UTC_TIME.fromDer(bytes)
    }.also { expected ->
      assertThat(expected).hasMessage("Failed to parse UTCTime 191216#30210Z")
    }
  }

  @Test fun `cannot decode generalized time with offset`() {

        // Decode and verify
        fileStandardInfo.decode(buffer, 0, buffer.length);
        assertEquals(expectedEndOfFile, fileStandardInfo.getSize());
    }

    @Test
    @DisplayName("Test size method returns 22")
    void testSize() {
        assertEquals(22, fileStandardInfo.size());
    }

    @Test
    @DisplayName("Test decode with valid data")