class Item(BaseModel):
    id: str
    value: str


responses = {
    404: {"description": "Item not found"},
    302: {"description": "The item was moved"},
    403: {"description": "Not enough privileges"},
}


app = FastAPI()


@app.get(
    "/items/{item_id}",
    response_model=Item,
    responses={**responses, 200: {"content": {"image/png": {}}}},
)

                    "responses": {
                        "404": {"description": "Item not found"},
                        "302": {"description": "The item was moved"},
                        "403": {"description": "Not enough privileges"},
                        "200": {
                            "description": "Successful Response",
                            "content": {
                                "image/png": {},

Date:   Sat Jun 15 11:27:17 2019 -0700

    [security] Match ${aws:username} exactly instead of prefix match (#7791)

    This PR fixes a security issue where an IAM user based
    on his policy is granted more privileges than restricted
    by the users IAM policy.

    This is due to an issue of prefix based Matcher() function
    which was incorrectly matching prefix based on resource
    prefixes instead of exact match.
```

	Remove(ctx context.Context, object string, rv remoteVersionID) error
	InUse(ctx context.Context) (bool, error)
}

const probeObject = "probeobject"

// checkWarmBackend checks if tier config credentials have sufficient privileges
// to perform all operations defined in the WarmBackend interface.
func checkWarmBackend(ctx context.Context, w WarmBackend) error {
	remoteVersionID, err := w.Put(ctx, probeObject, strings.NewReader("MinIO"), 5)

### END INIT INFO

PATH=/bin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/usr/sbin
NAME=fess
DESC="Fess Server"
DEFAULT=/etc/default/$NAME

if [ `id -u` -ne 0 ]; then
	echo "You need root privileges to run this script"
	exit 1
fi


. /lib/lsb/init-functions

if [ -r /etc/default/rcS ]; then
	. /etc/default/rcS
fi

# The following variables can be overwritten in $DEFAULT

from anywhere, and executes the graphs it is sent without performing any checks.
Therefore, if you run a `tf.train.Server` in your network, anybody with access
to the network can execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the user
running the `tf.train.Server`.

## Untrusted inputs during training and prediction

TensorFlow supports a wide range of input data formats. For example it can

## Privileges required

- find accounts whose group memberships have changed; access policies available to a credential are updated to reflect the change, i.e. they will lose any privileges associated with a group they are removed from, and gain any privileges associated with a group they are added to.

	// Instead, we track which UIDs we repaired and skip them if already repaired.
	//
	// An alternative would be to write something to the Pod (status, annotation, etc).
	// However, this requires elevated privileges we want to avoid
	if uid, f := c.repairedPods[key]; f {
		if uid == pod.UID {
			log.Debugf("Skipping pod, already repaired")
		} else {

This client could be a browser with a frontend, a code from someone else, an IoT device, etc.

You could need to tell the client that:

* The client doesn't have enough privileges for that operation.
* The client doesn't have access to that resource.
* The item the client was trying to access doesn't exist.
* etc.