_, err := certificate.Verify(x509.VerifyOptions{
			KeyUsages: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{
				x509.ExtKeyUsageClientAuth,
			},
			Roots: globalRootCAs,
		})
		if err != nil {
			writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidClientCertificate, err)
			return
		}
	} else {
		// Technically, there is no security argument for verifying the key usage

	// Ensure the value being sent is kept alive until the
	// receiver copies it out. The sudog has a pointer to the
	// stack object, but sudogs aren't considered as roots of the
	// stack tracer.
	KeepAlive(ep)

	// someone woke us up.
	if mysg != gp.waiting {
		throw("G waiting list is corrupted")
	}
	gp.waiting = nil
	gp.activeStackChans = false

	Service *ServiceReference `json:"service,omitempty" protobuf:"bytes,1,opt,name=service"`

	// caBundle is a PEM encoded CA bundle which will be used to validate the webhook's server certificate.
	// If unspecified, system trust roots on the apiserver are used.
	// +optional
	CABundle []byte `json:"caBundle,omitempty" protobuf:"bytes,2,opt,name=caBundle"`
}

// ServiceReference holds a reference to Service.legacy.k8s.io

	Service *ServiceReference `json:"service,omitempty" protobuf:"bytes,1,opt,name=service"`

	// caBundle is a PEM encoded CA bundle which will be used to validate the webhook's server certificate.
	// If unspecified, system trust roots on the apiserver are used.
	// +optional
	CABundle []byte `json:"caBundle,omitempty" protobuf:"bytes,2,opt,name=caBundle"`
}

// ServiceReference holds a reference to Service.legacy.k8s.io

		buildAction := a

		a = b.cacheAction("install-shlib "+shlib, nil, func() *Action {
			// Determine the eventual install target.
			// The install target is root/pkg/shlib, where root is the source root
			// in which all the packages lie.
			// TODO(rsc): Perhaps this cross-root check should apply to the full
			// transitive package dependency list, not just the ones named
			// on the command line?

		if _, ok := kept[cur]; ok {
			g.Nodes = append(g.Nodes, cur)
			continue
		}

		// If a node has no parents, then delete all of the in edges of its
		// children to make them each roots of their own trees.
		if len(cur.In) == 0 {
			for _, outEdge := range cur.Out {
				delete(outEdge.Dest.In, cur)
			}
			continue
		}

  * Running against a secured etcd requires these flags to be passed to
kube-apiserver (instead of --etcd-config):
     * --etcd-certfile, --etcd-keyfile (if using client cert auth)
     * --etcd-cafile (if not using system roots)
  * As part of preparation in 1.2 for adding support for protocol buffers (and the
direct YAML support in the API available today), the Content-Type and Accept

  //
  // +optional
  optional ServiceReference service = 1;

  // caBundle is a PEM encoded CA bundle which will be used to validate the webhook's server certificate.
  // If unspecified, system trust roots on the apiserver are used.
  // +optional
  optional bytes caBundle = 2;

  //
  // +optional
  optional ServiceReference service = 1;

  // caBundle is a PEM encoded CA bundle which will be used to validate the webhook's server certificate.
  // If unspecified, system trust roots on the apiserver are used.
  // +optional
  optional bytes caBundle = 2;
}

// WebhookConversion describes how to call a conversion webhook
message WebhookConversion {

        formatter.node("child2")
        formatter.endChildren()

        then:
        formatter.toString() == toPlatformLineSeparators("""root1:
  - child1
  - child2
root2: child1
root3:
  - child1
  - child2""")
    }

    def "can append to root node"() {
        when:
        formatter.node("Some ")
        formatter.append("thing")
        formatter.append(".")

        then: