istioctl x waypoint delete

  # Delete a waypoint by name, which can obtain from istioctl x waypoint list
  istioctl x waypoint delete waypoint-name --namespace default

  # Delete several waypoints by name
  istioctl x waypoint delete waypoint-name1 waypoint-name2 --namespace default

  # Delete all waypoints in a specific namespace
  istioctl x waypoint delete --all --namespace default`,

If the target destination has a waypoint, we enforce that the request is coming from that waypoint. Otherwise, the request is rejected.
If there is no waypoint, ztunnel will enforce RBAC policies against the request.

If all checks pass, ztunnel will open a connection to the target. This will spoof the source IP (from `Forwarded` for waypoints, or the incoming IP otherwise).

No waypoints found....

        {{- else }}
        image: "{{ .ProxyImage }}"
        {{- end }}
        {{with .Values.global.imagePullPolicy }}imagePullPolicy: "{{.}}"{{end}}
        args:
        - proxy
        - waypoint
        - --domain
        - $(POD_NAMESPACE).svc.{{ .Values.global.proxy.clusterDomain }}
        - --serviceCluster
        - {{.ServiceAccount}}.$(POD_NAMESPACE)
        - --proxyLogLevel

// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.

package waypoint

import (
	"bytes"
	"context"
	"fmt"
	"os"
	"strings"
	"testing"

	metav1 "k8s.io/apimachinery/pkg/apis/meta/v1"
	gateway "sigs.k8s.io/gateway-api/apis/v1"

	"istio.io/api/label"

	if wl.Waypoint == nil {
		return "None"
	}

	if svc, ok := services[wl.Waypoint.Destination]; ok {
		return svc.Name
	}

	return "NA" // Shouldn't normally reach here
}

func serviceWaypointName(svc *ZtunnelService, services map[string]*ZtunnelService) string {
	if svc.Waypoint == nil {
		return "None"
	}

	})
	fmt.Fprintln(w, "NAMESPACE\tSERVICE NAME\tSERVICE VIP\tWAYPOINT")

	for _, svc := range svcs {
		var ip string
		if len(svc.Addresses) > 0 {
			_, ip, _ = strings.Cut(svc.Addresses[0], "/")
		}
		waypoint := serviceWaypointName(svc, zDump.Services)
		fmt.Fprintf(w, "%v\t%v\t%v\t%v\n",
			svc.Namespace, svc.Name, ip, waypoint)
	}
	return w.Flush()
}

	Zone    string `json:"zone,omitempty"`
	Subzone string `json:"subzone,omitempty"`
}

type ZtunnelWorkload struct {
	WorkloadIPs       []string          `json:"workloadIps"`
	Waypoint          *Waypoint         `json:"waypoint,omitempty"`
	Protocol          string            `json:"protocol"`
	Name              string            `json:"name"`
	Namespace         string            `json:"namespace"`

      "uid": "Kubernetes//Pod/bookinfo/namespace-istio-waypoint-d94944bf6-z89g2",
      "name": "namespace-istio-waypoint-d94944bf6-z89g2",
      "namespace": "bookinfo",
      "trustDomain": "cluster.local",
      "serviceAccount": "namespace-istio-waypoint",
      "workloadName": "namespace-istio-waypoint",
      "workloadType": "deployment",
      "canonicalName": "namespace-istio-waypoint",
      "canonicalRevision": "latest",

a `STRICT` `PeerAuthentication`, unauthenticated traffic will be rejected before it reaches the Waypoint proxy. If the effective policy is `PERMISSIVE` (the default), the ztunnel will open a vanilla TLS HBONE tunnel (NOTE: this is not mTLS) to the Waypoint proxy and forward the traffic over that connection without presenting a client certificate. Therefore, it is absolutely critical that the waypoint proxy not assume any identity from incoming connections, even if the ztunnel is hairpinning. In other...