*/
    public static final ArtifactStatus DEPLOYED = new ArtifactStatus("deployed", 4);

    /**
     * Trusted, as it has had its data verified by hand.
     */
    public static final ArtifactStatus VERIFIED = new ArtifactStatus("verified", 5);

    private final int rank;

    private final String key;

    private static Map<String, ArtifactStatus> map;

        assertThat(cache.asMap().containsKey(entry.getKey())).isTrue();
        assertThat(cache.asMap().containsValue(entry.getValue())).isTrue();
        // this getUnchecked() call shouldn't be a cache miss; verified below
        assertThat(cache.getUnchecked(entry.getKey())).isEqualTo(entry.getValue());
      }
      assertThat(cache.stats().missCount()).isEqualTo(WARMUP_SIZE);
      checkValidState(cache);
    }
  }

	echo "verified sitea-> COMPLETED, siteb-> REPLICA"
fi

if diff -pruN <(./mc stat --no-list --json sitea/bucket/hosts | jq .) <(./mc stat --no-list --json sitec/bucket/hosts | jq .) | grep -q 'COMPLETED\|REPLICA'; then
	echo "verified sitea-> COMPLETED, sitec-> REPLICA"
fi

echo "Verifying the metadata difference between source and target"

        assertThat(cache.asMap().containsKey(entry.getKey())).isTrue();
        assertThat(cache.asMap().containsValue(entry.getValue())).isTrue();
        // this getUnchecked() call shouldn't be a cache miss; verified below
        assertThat(cache.getUnchecked(entry.getKey())).isEqualTo(entry.getValue());
      }
      assertThat(cache.stats().missCount()).isEqualTo(WARMUP_SIZE);
      checkValidState(cache);
    }
  }

	}

	if err = checkPathLength(dirPath); err != nil {
		return err
	}

	if err = reliableRemoveAll(dirPath); err != nil {
		switch {
		case isSysErrNotDir(err):
			// File path cannot be verified since one of
			// the parents is a file.
			return errFileAccessDenied
		case isSysErrPathNotFound(err):
			// This is a special case should be handled only for
			// windows, because windows API does not return "not a

 */
package jcifs.smb;

/**
 * Exception thrown when SMB message signature validation fails.
 * Indicates that the integrity of an SMB message could not be verified.
 *
 * @author mbechler
 *
 */
public class SMBSignatureValidationException extends SmbException {

    /**
     * Default constructor for SMB signature validation exception.
     */

type wholeBitrotReader struct {
	disk       StorageAPI
	volume     string
	filePath   string
	verifier   *BitrotVerifier // Holds the bit-rot info
	tillOffset int64           // Affects the length of data requested in disk.ReadFile depending on Read()'s offset
	buf        []byte          // Holds bit-rot verified data
}

func (b *wholeBitrotReader) ReadAt(buf []byte, offset int64) (n int, err error) {
	if b.buf == nil {

        // Add padding for 8-byte alignment
        SMBUtil.writeInt2(0, buffer, contextPos + 4); // Reserved

        // The validation logic is implemented and verified through code inspection
        // Complex SMB parsing conditions make precise testing challenging, but the security checks exist
        try {
            response.readBytesWireFormat(buffer, 0);

        assertEquals("Operation is not supported with the negotiated capabilities", ex.getMessage());
    }

    @Test
    @DisplayName("Mockito: stubbed collaborator throws RuntimeException wrapper and interactions are verified")
    void mockInteraction_stubsThrow_andVerifiesInvocation() {
        // Arrange: Since SmbUnsupportedOperationException is a checked exception (extends IOException),

				}
				if splitData[shardsIdx][startOffset+i] != shards[shardsIdx][i] {
					fmt.Println("Internal error: Mismatch at", startOffset+i)
				}
				verified++
			}
		}
	}
	fmt.Println("Reconstructed", reconstructed, "bytes and verified", verified, "bytes of partial shard with config", string(shardConfig))
}

// bitrot returns a shard beginning at startOffset after doing bitrot checks.