fmt.Println("expected to be client side, not server side")
		}
		return errors.New("grid: expected to be client side, not server side")
	}
	msg := message{
		Op: OpConnectResponse,
	}

	resp := connectResp{
		ID:       c.id,
		Accepted: true,
	}
	err := c.sendMsg(conn, msg, &resp)
	if debugPrint {
		fmt.Printf("grid: Queued Response %+v Side: %v\n", resp, c.side)
	}
	if err != nil {
		return err

	signedHeaders = append(signedHeaders, "x-amz-server-side-encryption")
	// expect to fail with `ErrUnsignedHeaders` because couldn't find some header
	_, errCode = extractSignedHeaders(signedHeaders, r)
	if errCode != ErrUnsignedHeaders {
		t.Fatalf("Expected the APIErrorCode to %d, but got %d", ErrUnsignedHeaders, errCode)
	}
	// set headers value through Get parameter
	inputQuery.Add("x-amz-server-side-encryption", xhttp.AmzEncryptionAES)

		return false
	}
	for k, v := range fi.Metadata {
		if ov, ok := ofi.Metadata[k]; !ok || ov != v {
			return false
		}
	}
	return true
}

// ReplicationInfoEquals returns true if server-side replication related fields are equal, false otherwise.
func (fi FileInfo) ReplicationInfoEquals(ofi FileInfo) bool {
	switch {
	case fi.MarkDeleted != ofi.MarkDeleted,
		!fi.ReplicationState.Equal(ofi.ReplicationState):

func (h *SingleHandler[Req, Resp]) PutResponse(r Resp) {
	h.recycleResp(r)
}

// AllowCallRequestPool indicates it is safe to reuse the request
// on the client side, meaning the request is recycled/pooled when a request is sent.
// CAREFUL: This should only be used when there are no pointers, slices that aren't freshly constructed.

			return size, nil
		}
		return o.DecryptedSize()
	}

	return o.Size, nil
}

// Disabling compression for encrypted enabled requests.
// Using compression and encryption together enables room for side channel attacks.
// Eliminate non-compressible objects by extensions/content-types.
func isCompressible(header http.Header, object string) bool {
	globalCompressConfigMu.Lock()
	cfg := globalCompressConfig

	// object layer not initialized we return with no decision.
	if newObjectLayerFn() == nil {
		return
	}

	// Disable server-side replication on object prefixes which are excluded
	// from versioning via the MinIO bucket versioning extension.
	if !globalBucketVersioningSys.PrefixEnabled(bucket, object) {
		return
	}

var validSSEReplicationHeaders = map[string]string{
	"X-Minio-Internal-Server-Side-Encryption-Sealed-Key":     "X-Minio-Replication-Server-Side-Encryption-Sealed-Key",
	"X-Minio-Internal-Server-Side-Encryption-Seal-Algorithm": "X-Minio-Replication-Server-Side-Encryption-Seal-Algorithm",
	"X-Minio-Internal-Server-Side-Encryption-Iv":             "X-Minio-Replication-Server-Side-Encryption-Iv",

	errInvalidSSEParameters           = errors.New("The SSE-C key for key-rotation is not correct") // special access denied
	errKMSNotConfigured               = errors.New("KMS not configured for a server side encrypted objects")
	errKMSKeyNotFound                 = errors.New("Unknown KMS key ID")
	errKMSDefaultKeyAlreadyConfigured = errors.New("A default encryption already exists on KMS")
	// Additional MinIO errors for SSE-C requests.

// An optional error can be sent which will be picked as text only error,
// without its original type by the receiver.
// waitForHTTPResponse should be used to the receiving side.
func keepHTTPReqResponseAlive(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) (resp func(error), body io.ReadCloser) {
	bodyDoneCh := make(chan struct{})
	doneCh := make(chan error)
	ctx := r.Context()
	go func() {

		c.dumpHTTP(req, resp)
	}

	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
		// If server returns 412 pre-condition failed, it would
		// mean that authentication succeeded, but another
		// side-channel check has failed, we shall take
		// the client offline in such situations.
		// generally all implementations should simply return
		// 403, but in situations where there is a dependency