exportContentStrings := map[string]string{

	vars := mux.Vars(r)
	bucket := vars["bucket"]

	objAPI := api.ObjectAPI()
	if objAPI == nil {
		writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrServerNotInitialized), r.URL)
		return
	}

	// Allow putBucketACL if policy action is set, since this is a dummy call
	// we are simply re-purposing the bucketPolicyAction.
	if s3Error := checkRequestAuthType(ctx, r, policy.PutBucketPolicyAction, bucket, ""); s3Error != ErrNone {

				rc := disconnectReader{r: bytes.NewReader(b)}
				defer func() {
					rc.Close()
					<-asyncWriters
					wg.Done()
					//nolint:staticcheck // SA6002 we are fine with the tiny alloc
					poolBuf128k.Put(b)
				}()
				if err := putObject(&rc, fi, name); err != nil {
					if o.ignoreErrs {
						s3LogIf(ctx, err)
						return
					}
					asyncErrMu.Lock()
					if asyncErr == nil {

requests_deadline               (duration)  set the deadline for API requests waiting to be processed (default: '10s')
cluster_deadline                (duration)  set the deadline for cluster readiness check (default: '10s')
cors_allow_origin               (csv)       set comma separated list of origins allowed for CORS requests (default: '*')

	globalCompressConfig   compress.Config

	// Some standard object extensions which we strictly dis-allow for compression.
	standardExcludeCompressExtensions = []string{".gz", ".bz2", ".rar", ".zip", ".7z", ".xz", ".mp4", ".mkv", ".mov", ".jpg", ".png", ".gif"}

	// Some standard content-types which we strictly dis-allow for compression.

	case emptySHA256:
		// some broken clients set empty-sha256
		// with > 0 content-length in the body,
		// we should skip such clients and allow
		// blindly such insecure clients only if
		// S3 strict compatibility is disabled.

		// We return true only in situations when
		// deployment has asked MinIO to allow for
		// such broken clients and content-length > 0.
		return r.ContentLength > 0 && !globalServerCtxt.StrictS3Compat
	}
	return false

}

func (e *lockedLastMinuteLatency) add(value time.Duration) {
	e.addSize(value, 0)
}

// addSize will add a duration and size.
func (e *lockedLastMinuteLatency) addSize(value time.Duration, sz int64) {
	// alloc on every call, so we have a clean entry to swap in.
	t := time.Now().Unix()
	e.init.Do(func() {
		e.cached.Store(&AccElem{})
		atomic.StoreInt64(&e.cachedSec, t)
	})
	acc := e.cached.Load()

  ingressClassName: ~
  labels: {}
    # node-role.kubernetes.io/ingress: platform
  annotations: {}
    # kubernetes.io/ingress.class: nginx
    # kubernetes.io/tls-acme: "true"
    # kubernetes.io/ingress.allow-http: "false"
    # kubernetes.io/ingress.global-static-ip-name: ""
    # nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/secure-backends: "true"
    # nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/backend-protocol: "HTTPS"

MINIO_ACCESSKEY_SECRETKEY_TMP="/tmp/accessKey_and_secretKey_svcacct_tmp"

# connectToMinio
# Use a check-sleep-check loop to wait for MinIO service to be available
connectToMinio() {
  SCHEME=$1
  ATTEMPTS=0 ; LIMIT=29 ; # Allow 30 attempts
  set -e ; # fail if we can't read the keys.
  ACCESS=$(cat /config/rootUser) ; SECRET=$(cat /config/rootPassword) ;
  set +e ; # The connections to minio are allowed to fail.

	// such a case, is a security issue. Ideally, we should not allow such
	// behavior, but for compatibility with the Console, we currently allow it.
	//
	// TODO:
	//
	// 1. fix console behavior and allow this inheritance for service accounts
	// created before a certain (TBD) future date.
	//
	// 2. do not allow empty statement policies for service accounts.