} catch (ignored: IllegalArgumentException) {
    }
    try {
      builder.connectTimeout(Duration.ofNanos(1))
    } catch (ignored: IllegalArgumentException) {
    }
    try {
      builder.writeTimeout(Duration.ofNanos(1))
    } catch (ignored: IllegalArgumentException) {
    }
    try {
      builder.readTimeout(Duration.ofNanos(1))
    } catch (ignored: IllegalArgumentException) {
    }

    override fun close() {
      if (closed) {
        throw AssertionError("Already closed")
      }
      try {
        source.close()
      } catch (ignored: IOException) {
      }
      try {
        sink.close()
      } catch (ignored: IOException) {
      }
      closed = true
    }

    override fun cancel() {
      canceled = true
      sourcePipe.cancel()
      sinkPipe.cancel()

   *
   * If a challenge uses the `token68` variant instead of auth params, there is exactly one
   * auth param in the challenge at key null. Invalid headers and challenges are ignored.
   * No semantic validation is done, for example that `Basic` auth must have a `realm`
   * auth param, this is up to the caller that interprets these challenges.
   */
  fun challenges(): List<Challenge> {

   * response is ready.
   */
  @Test
  fun dispatchBlocksWaitingForEnqueue() {
    Thread {
      try {
        Thread.sleep(1000)
      } catch (ignored: InterruptedException) {
      }
      server.enqueue(MockResponse().setBody("enqueued in the background"))
    }.start()
    val connection = server.url("/").toUrl().openConnection()

    Platform.get().log("results $results", Platform.WARN)

    assertTrue(results.session_ticket_supported)
    assertEquals("Probably Okay", results.rating)
    // TODO map to expected versions automatically, test ignored for now.  Run manually.
    assertEquals("TLS 1.3", results.tls_version)
    assertEquals(0, results.insecure_cipher_suites.size)

    assertEquals(TlsVersion.TLS_1_3, response.handshake?.tlsVersion)

     *
     * The string should contain exactly one certificate and one private key in [PKCS #8][rfc_5208]
     * format. It should not contain any other PEM-encoded blocks, but it may contain other text
     * which will be ignored.
     *
     * Encode a held certificate into this format by concatenating the results of
     * [certificatePem()][certificatePem] and [privateKeyPkcs8Pem()][privateKeyPkcs8Pem].
     *

    assertThat(verifier.verify("a.foo.com", session)).isFalse()
    assertThat(verifier.verify("bar.com", session)).isTrue()
    assertThat(verifier.verify("a.bar.com", session)).isFalse()
  }

  /**
   * Ignored due to incompatibilities between Android and Java on how non-ASCII subject alt names
   * are parsed. Android fails to parse these, which means we fall back to the CN. The RI does parse
   * them, so the CN is unused.
   */

            throw IOException("PROTOCOL_ERROR SETTINGS_MAX_FRAME_SIZE: $value")
          }
        }

        // SETTINGS_MAX_HEADER_LIST_SIZE
        6 -> { // Advisory only, so ignored.
        }

        // Must ignore setting with unknown id.
        else -> {
        }
      }
      settings[id] = value
    }
    handler.settings(false, settings)
  }

  @Throws(IOException::class)

http://GOO\u00a0\u3000goo.com

# Other types of space (no-break, zero-width, zero-width-no-break) are
# name-prepped away to nothing.
# U+200B, U+2060, and U+FEFF, are ignored
http://GOO\u200b\u2060\ufeffgoo.com  s:http p:/ h:googoo.com

# Ideographic full stop (full-width period for Chinese, etc.) should be
# treated as a dot.
# U+3002 is mapped to U+002E (dot)

              // Ignore this attribute, it isn't recognizable as a date.
            }
          }
          attributeName.equals("max-age", ignoreCase = true) -> {
            try {
              deltaSeconds = parseMaxAge(attributeValue)
              persistent = true
            } catch (_: NumberFormatException) {
              // Ignore this attribute, it isn't recognizable as a max age.