Der TLS-Terminierungsproxy hätte Zugriff auf ein oder mehrere **TLS-Zertifikate** (HTTPS-Zertifikate).

Mithilfe der oben beschriebenen **SNI-Erweiterung** würde der TLS-Terminierungsproxy herausfinden, welches der verfügbaren TLS-Zertifikate (HTTPS) er für diese Verbindung verwenden muss, und zwar das, welches mit der vom Client erwarteten Domain übereinstimmt.

In diesem Fall würde er das Zertifikat für `someapp.example.com` verwenden.

* HAProxy
    * Mit einer externen Komponente wie Certbot für Zertifikat-Erneuerungen
* Kubernetes mit einem Ingress Controller wie Nginx
    * Mit einer externen Komponente wie cert-manager für Zertifikat-Erneuerungen
* Es wird intern von einem Cloud-Anbieter als Teil seiner Dienste verwaltet (siehe unten 👇)

    val certificate = heldCertificate.certificate
    assertThat(certificate.getSubjectX500Principal().name, "self-signed")
      .isEqualTo(certificate.getIssuerX500Principal().name)
    assertThat(certificate.getIssuerX500Principal().name).matches(Regex("CN=[0-9a-f-]{36}"))
    assertThat(certificate.serialNumber).isEqualTo(BigInteger.ONE)
    assertThat(certificate.subjectAlternativeNames).isNull()

on-300-000-iranians-using-fake-google-certificate.html). It also assumes your HTTPS servers’ certificates are signed by a certificate authority.

Use [CertificatePinner](https://square.github.io/okhttp/4.x/okhttp/okhttp3/-certificate-pinner/) to restrict which certificates and certificate authorities are trusted. Certificate pinning increases security, but limits your server team’s abilities to update their TLS certificates. **Do not use certificate pinning without the blessing of your server’s...

    }

    // Should not be pinned:
    certificatePinner.check("uk", listOf(certB1.certificate))
    certificatePinner.check("co.uk", listOf(certB1.certificate))
    certificatePinner.check("anotherexample.co.uk", listOf(certB1.certificate))
    certificatePinner.check("foo.anotherexample.co.uk", listOf(certB1.certificate))
  }

  @Test
  fun testBadPin() {

		}
		certificate, err := createTempFile("public.crt", testCase.certificate)
		if err != nil {
			os.Remove(privateKey)
			t.Fatalf("Test %d: failed to create tmp certificate file: %v", i, err)
		}

		if testCase.password != "" {
			t.Setenv(EnvCertPassword, testCase.password)
		}
		_, err = LoadX509KeyPair(certificate, privateKey)
		if err != nil && !testCase.shouldFail {

    // Add a bad intermediate CA and have that issue a rogue certificate for localhost. Prepare
    // an SSL context for an attacking webserver. It includes both these rogue certificates plus the
    // trusted good certificate above. The attack is that by including the good certificate in the
    // chain, we may trick the certificate pinner into accepting the rouge certificate.
    val compromisedIntermediateCa =
      HeldCertificate.Builder()

In this case, it would use the certificate for `someapp.example.com`.

<img src="/img/deployment/https/https03.svg">

The client already **trusts** the entity that generated that TLS certificate (in this case Let's Encrypt, but we'll see about that later), so it can **verify** that the certificate is valid.

  @get:JvmName("keyPair") val keyPair: KeyPair,
  @get:JvmName("certificate") val certificate: X509Certificate,
) {
  @JvmName("-deprecated_certificate")
  @Deprecated(
    message = "moved to val",
    replaceWith = ReplaceWith(expression = "certificate"),
    level = DeprecationLevel.ERROR,
  )
  fun certificate(): X509Certificate = certificate

  @JvmName("-deprecated_keyPair")
  @Deprecated(

				}
				return certificate, nil
			}

			reloadCertEvents := make(chan tls.Certificate, 1)
			certificate, err := certs.NewCertificate(env.Get(kms.EnvKESClientCert, ""), env.Get(kms.EnvKESClientKey, ""), loadX509KeyPair)
			if err != nil {
				logger.Fatal(err, "Failed to load KES client certificate")
			}
			certificate.Watch(context.Background(), 15*time.Minute, syscall.SIGHUP)
			certificate.Notify(reloadCertEvents)