rn NaN;if(!(s=za(e,this)).isValid())return NaN;switch(n=6e4*(s.utcOffset()-this.utcOffset()),a=O(a)){case"year":d=Ba(this,s)/12;break;case"month":d=Ba(this,s);break;case"quarter":d=Ba(this,s)/3;break;case"second":d=(this-s)/1e3;break;case"minute":d=(this-s)/6e4;break;case"hour":d=(this-s)/36e5;break;case"day":d=(this-s-n)/864e5;break;case"week":d=(this-s-n)/6048e5;break;default:d=this-s}return t?d:T(d)},it.endOf=function(e){return void 0===(e=O(e))||"millisecond"===e?this:("date"===e&&(e="day"),...

	}
	return
}
</pre>

<h3 id="Break_statements">Break statements</h3>

<p>
A "break" statement terminates execution of the innermost
<a href="#For_statements">"for"</a>,
<a href="#Switch_statements">"switch"</a>, or
<a href="#Select_statements">"select"</a> statement
within the same function.
</p>

<pre class="ebnf">
BreakStmt = "break" [ Label ] .
</pre>

<p>

*   Kubelet evictions now take pod priority into account ([#53542](https://github.com/kube...

### Other notable changes

* Fix to prevent downward api change break on older versions ([#53673](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/53673), [@timothysc](https://github.com/timothysc))

this validation could allow authenticated requests destined for Nodes to be redirected to the API Server through its private network.

The merged fix enforces validation against the proxying address for a Node. In some cases, the fix can break clients that depend on the `nodes/proxy` subresource, specifically if a kubelet advertises a localhost or link-local address to the Kubernetes control plane. Configuring an egress proxy for egress to the cluster network can also mitigate this vulnerability....

  The API Server will no longer proxy non-101 responses for upgrade requests. This could break proxied backends (such as an extension API server) that respond to upgrade requests with a non-101 response code. ([#92941](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/92941), [@tallclair](https://github.com/tallclair)) [SIG API Machinery]

### Tools. Kapt

- [`KT-57389`](https://youtrack.jetbrains.com/issue/KT-57389) KAPT3 uses a Javac API for JCImport which will break in JDK 21
- [`KT-60507`](https://youtrack.jetbrains.com/issue/KT-60507) Kapt: "IllegalAccessError: superclass access check failed" using java 21 toolchain

### Tools. Scripts

this validation could allow authenticated requests destined for Nodes to be redirected to the API Server through its private network.

The merged fix enforces validation against the proxying address for a Node. In some cases, the fix can break clients that depend on the `nodes/proxy` subresource, specifically if a kubelet advertises a localhost or link-local address to the Kubernetes control plane. Configuring an egress proxy for egress to the cluster network can also mitigate this vulnerability....

"super-admin.conf" file is now deployed. The User in `admin.conf` is now bound to a new RBAC Group `kubeadm:cluster-admins` that has `cluster-admin` `ClusterRole` access. The User in `super-admin.conf` is now bound to the `system:masters` built-in super-powers / break-glass Group that can bypass RBAC. Before this change, the default `admin.conf` was bound to `system:masters` Group, which was undesired. Executing `kubeadm init phase kubeconfig all` or just `kubeadm init` will now generate the new `super-admin.conf`...

pkg syscall (netbsd-arm64-cgo), const SYS_BIND = 104
pkg syscall (netbsd-arm64-cgo), const SYS_BIND ideal-int
pkg syscall (netbsd-arm64-cgo), const SYS_BREAK = 17
pkg syscall (netbsd-arm64-cgo), const SYS_BREAK ideal-int
pkg syscall (netbsd-arm64-cgo), const SYS_CHDIR = 12
pkg syscall (netbsd-arm64-cgo), const SYS_CHDIR ideal-int
pkg syscall (netbsd-arm64-cgo), const SYS_CHFLAGS = 34