}
  const pr_title = pr_resp.data.title;
  // Assign to PR owner and reviewers
  const assignees = pr_resp.data.assignees.concat(pr_resp.data.requested_reviewers);
  let assignee_logins = assignees.map(x => x.login);
  assignee_logins.push(pr_resp.data.user.login);
  console.log(assignee_logins);
  // Create an new GH Issue and reference the Original PR

  std::unique_ptr<char[]> buffer(new char[kPosixCopyFileBufferSize]);

  off_t offset = 0;
  int bytes_transferred = 0;
  int rc = 1;
  // When `sendfile` returns 0 we stop copying and let callers handle this.
  while (offset < size && rc > 0) {
    size_t chunk = size - offset;
    if (chunk > kPosixCopyFileBufferSize) chunk = kPosixCopyFileBufferSize;

    rc = read(src_fd, buffer.get(), chunk);

    username
  });
  if (user.status >= 400) {
    console.log(user);
    throw `Error Getting user data for ${username}`;
  }
  const email = user.data.email;
  let domain = "";
  if (email && email.lastIndexOf("@") != -1)
    domain = email.substring(email.lastIndexOf("@") +1);
  console.log(domain);
  return domain;
};

   
   *Please let us know if this helps.*
   
windows_comment: >
   From the stack trace it looks like you are hitting windows path length limit.
      * Try to disable path length limit on Windows 10.
        * Refer [disable path length limit instructions guide.](https://mspoweruser.com/ntfs-260-character-windows-10/)
   

int CopyFileContents(int dst_fd, int src_fd, off_t size) {
  off_t offset = 0;
  int bytes_transferred = 0;
  int rc = 1;
  // When `sendfile` returns 0 we stop copying and let callers handle this.
  while (offset < size && rc > 0) {
    // Use uint64 for safe compare SSIZE_MAX
    uint64_t chunk = size - offset;
    if (chunk > SSIZE_MAX) chunk = SSIZE_MAX;

your report:

  - A descriptive title
  - Your name and affiliation (if any).
  - A description of the technical details of the vulnerabilities.
  - A minimal example of the vulnerability. It is very important to let us know
    how we can reproduce your findings. For memory corruption triggerable in
    TensorFlow models, please demonstrate an exploit against one of Alphabet's
    models in <https://tfhub.dev/>

  virtual bool IsCustomDevice(const string& device_name) = 0;

  // Register a custom device. It will return error is the device name is
  // already registered.
  // TODO(tfrt-devs): Remove this method. Let caller register it directly into
  // CustomDeviceOpHandler.
  virtual Status RegisterCustomDevice(const string& name,
                                      std::unique_ptr<CustomDevice> device) = 0;

    # https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/issues/10521
    # Overriding eigen strong inline speeds up the compiling of
    # conv_grad_ops_3d.cc and conv_ops_3d.cc by 20 minutes,
    # but this also hurts the performance. Let users decide what they want.
    write_to_bazelrc('build --define=override_eigen_strong_inline=true')


def config_info_line(name, help_text):

        tensorflow::unwrap(handles[i]);
    if (tensorflow::CustomDeviceTensorHandle::classof(unwrapped_handle)) {
      // One of the inputs we're trying to pack is on a custom device. We'll let
      // the first custom device we see handle all of the packing.
      auto* custom_device_handle =
          tensorflow::down_cast<tensorflow::CustomDeviceTensorHandle*>(
              unwrapped_handle);

// through custom device implementations).
//
// TODO(allenl): Currently these are black boxes, but we should have some way to
// inspect values. This would let people e.g. copy over most attributes and then
// modify some based on their values.

// A reference to an op's name -> attribute mapping
typedef struct TFE_OpAttrs TFE_OpAttrs;