if err != nil {
		return nil, nil, false, err
	}
	for _, file := range files {
		// Ignore all
		// - regular files
		// - "CAs" directory
		// - any directory which starts with ".."
		if file.Mode().IsRegular() || file.Name() == "CAs" || strings.HasPrefix(file.Name(), "..") {
			continue
		}
		if file.Mode()&os.ModeSymlink == os.ModeSymlink {

	// Check and load Root CAs.
	globalRootCAs, err = certs.GetRootCAs(globalCertsCADir.Get())
	logger.FatalIf(err, "Failed to read root CAs (%v)", err)

	// Add the global public crts as part of global root CAs
	for _, publicCrt := range globalPublicCerts {
		globalRootCAs.AddCert(publicCrt)
	}

	// Register root CAs for remote ENVs
	env.RegisterGlobalCAs(globalRootCAs)

Requests for identities not running on the node are rejected.
This is critical to ensure that a compromised node does not compromise the entire mesh.

This CA enforcement is done by Istio's CA, and is a requirement for any alternative CAs integrating with Ztunnel.

Note: Ztunnel authenticates to the CA with a Kubernetes Service Account JWT token, which encodes the pod information, which is what enables this.

* Valider que `item_id` existe dans le chemin des requêtes `GET` et `PUT`.
* Valider que `item_id` est de type `int` pour les requêtes `GET` et `PUT`.
    * Si ce n'est pas le cas, le client voit une erreur utile et claire.
* Vérifier qu'il existe un paramètre de requête facultatif nommé `q` (comme dans `http://127.0.0.1:8000/items/foo?q=somequery`) pour les requêtes `GET`.

certs */}} {{- define "minio.tlsKeysVolumeMount" -}} {{- if .Values.tls.enabled }} - name: cert-secret-volume mountPath: {{ .Values.certsPath }} {{- end }} {{- if or .Values.tls.enabled (ne .Values.trustedCertsSecret "") }} {{- $casPath := printf "%s/CAs" .Values.certsPath | clean }} - name: trusted-cert-secret-volume mountPath: {{ $casPath }} {{- end }} {{- end -}} {{/* Formats volume for MinIO TLS keys and trusted certs */}} {{- define "minio.tlsKeysVolume" -}} {{- if .Values.tls.enabled }} - name:...