// The caller did not ask to update status account, do nothing
	case "":
	case string(madmin.AccountEnabled):
		cr.Status = auth.AccountOn
	case string(madmin.AccountDisabled):
		cr.Status = auth.AccountOff
	// Update account status
	case auth.AccountOn, auth.AccountOff:
		cr.Status = opts.status
	default:
		return updatedAt, errors.New("unknown account status value")
	}

     * Defines the root of the LDAP directory tree for user lookups.
     */
    @Size(max = 1000)
    public String ldapBaseDn;

    /**
     * LDAP filter for finding user accounts.
     * Defines the search filter used to locate user accounts in LDAP.
     */
    @Size(max = 1000)
    public String ldapAccountFilter;

    /**
     * LDAP filter for finding groups.

		return
	}

	// Permission checks:
	//
	// 1. Any type of account (i.e. access keys (previously/still called service
	// accounts), STS accounts, internal IDP accounts, etc) with the
	// policy.UpdateServiceAccountAdminAction permission can update any service
	// account.
	//
	// 2. We would like to let a user update their own access keys, however it

		// Service accounts ops
		adminRouter.Methods(http.MethodPut).Path(adminVersion + "/add-service-account").HandlerFunc(adminMiddleware(adminAPI.AddServiceAccount))
		adminRouter.Methods(http.MethodPost).Path(adminVersion+"/update-service-account").HandlerFunc(adminMiddleware(adminAPI.UpdateServiceAccount)).Queries("accessKey", "{accessKey:.*}")

		if s3Err != ErrNone {
			return nil, nil, false, errAuthentication
		}

		maps.Copy(claims.MapClaims, eclaims)

		// if root access is disabled, disable all its service accounts and temporary credentials.
		if ucred.ParentUser == globalActiveCred.AccessKey && !globalAPIConfig.permitRootAccess() {
			return nil, nil, false, errAccessKeyDisabled
		}

		// Now check if we have a sessionPolicy.

			stsPolicyMappingsCount++
			// If a service account's parent user is not in iamUsersMap, the
			// parent is an STS account. Such accounts may have a policy mapped
			// on the parent user, so we load them. This is not needed for the
			// initial server startup, however, it is needed for the case where
			// the STS account's policy mapping (for example in LDAP mode) may

	c.assertSvcAccS3Access(ctx, s, cr, bucket)

	// 3. Check that svc account can restrict the policy, and that the
	// session policy can be updated.
	c.assertSvcAccSessionPolicyUpdate(ctx, s, s.adm, accessKey, bucket)

	// 4. Check that service account's secret key and account status can be
	// updated.
	c.assertSvcAccSecretKeyAndStatusUpdate(ctx, s, s.adm, accessKey, bucket)

	}

	user, _, s3Err := getReqAccessKeyV4(r, globalSite.Region(), serviceSTS)
	if s3Err != ErrNone {
		return auth.Credentials{}, s3Err
	}

	// Temporary credentials or Service accounts cannot generate further temporary credentials.
	if user.IsTemp() || user.IsServiceAccount() {
		return auth.Credentials{}, ErrAccessDenied
	}

	// Session tokens are not allowed in STS AssumeRole requests.

	// As the session policy exists, even if the parent is the root account, it
	// must be restricted by it. So, we set `.IsOwner` to false here
	// unconditionally.
	//
	// We also set `DenyOnly` arg to false here - this is an IMPORTANT corner
	// case: DenyOnly is used only for allowing an account to do actions related
	// to its own account (like create service accounts for itself, among

        if (username != null) {
            AccountAttempts account = accountAttempts.computeIfAbsent(username, k -> new AccountAttempts());
            account.recordFailure();

            if (account.getFailedAttempts() >= maxAttemptsPerAccount) {
                account.lockOut(lockoutDuration);
                totalAccountsLocked.incrementAndGet();