El TLS Termination Proxy tendría acceso a uno o más **certificados TLS** (certificados HTTPS).

Usando la **extensión SNI** discutida anteriormente, el TLS Termination Proxy verificaría cuál de los certificados TLS (HTTPS) disponibles debería usar para esta conexión, usando el que coincida con el dominio esperado por el cliente.

En este caso, usaría el certificado para `someapp.example.com`.

Avant Let's Encrypt, ces **certificats HTTPS** étaient vendus par des tiers de confiance.

Le processus d'acquisition de l'un de ces certificats était auparavant lourd, nécessitait pas mal de paperasses et les certificats étaient assez chers.

Mais ensuite, **[Let's Encrypt](https://letsencrypt.org/)** a été créé.

E tem que haver algo responsável por **renovar os certificados HTTPS**, pode ser o mesmo componente ou pode ser algo diferente.

### Ferramentas de exemplo para HTTPS { #example-tools-for-https }

Algumas das ferramentas que você pode usar como um proxy de terminação TLS são:

* Traefik
    * Lida automaticamente com renovações de certificados ✨
* Caddy
    * Lida automaticamente com renovações de certificados ✨
* Nginx

 * ```
 *
 * In this example the HTTP client already knows and trusts the last certificate, "Entrust Root
 * Certification Authority - G2". That certificate is used to verify the signature of the
 * intermediate certificate, "Entrust Certification Authority - L1M". The intermediate certificate
 * is used to verify the signature of the "www.squareup.com" certificate.
 *

    // Add a bad intermediate CA and have that issue a rogue certificate for localhost. Prepare
    // an SSL context for an attacking webserver. It includes both these rogue certificates plus the
    // trusted good certificate above. The attack is that by including the good certificate in the
    // chain, we may trick the certificate pinner into accepting the rouge certificate.
    val compromisedIntermediateCa =
      HeldCertificate

    /**
     * Returns the SHA-256 of `certificate`'s public key.
     *
     * In OkHttp 3.1.2 and earlier, this returned a SHA-1 hash of the public key. Both types are
     * supported, but SHA-256 is preferred.
     */
    @JvmStatic
    fun pin(certificate: Certificate): String {
      require(certificate is X509Certificate) { "Certificate pinning requires X509 certificates" }

      }
    }

  fun verify(
    host: String,
    certificate: X509Certificate,
  ): Boolean =
    when {
      host.canParseAsIpAddress() -> verifyIpAddress(host, certificate)
      else -> verifyHostname(host, certificate)
    }

  /** Returns true if [certificate] matches [ipAddress]. */
  private fun verifyIpAddress(
    ipAddress: String,
    certificate: X509Certificate,
  ): Boolean {

    assertThat(listOf(clientCertificate.certificate, clientIntermediate.certificate))
      .isEqualTo(serverHandshake.peerCertificates)
    assertThat(listOf(serverCertificate.certificate, serverIntermediate.certificate))
      .isEqualTo(serverHandshake.localCertificates)
    val clientHandshake = clientHandshakeFuture.get()
    assertThat(listOf(serverCertificate.certificate, serverIntermediate.certificate))

on-300-000-iranians-using-fake-google-certificate.html). It also assumes your HTTPS servers’ certificates are signed by a certificate authority.

Use [CertificatePinner](https://square.github.io/okhttp/5.x/okhttp/okhttp3/-certificate-pinner/) to restrict which certificates and certificate authorities are trusted. Certificate pinning increases security, but limits your server team’s abilities to update their TLS certificates. **Do not use certificate pinning without the blessing of your server’s...

In this case, it would use the certificate for `someapp.example.com`.

<img src="/img/deployment/https/https03.drawio.svg">

The client already **trusts** the entity that generated that TLS certificate (in this case Let's Encrypt, but we'll see about that later), so it can **verify** that the certificate is valid.