BMP, GIF, WAV, RAW, RAW\_PADDED, CSV and PROTO formats. All other input formats,
including tensorflow-io should be sandboxed if used to process untrusted data.

For example, if an attacker were to upload a malicious video file, they could
potentially exploit a vulnerability in the TensorFlow code that handles videos,
which could allow them to execute arbitrary code on the system running
TensorFlow.

        Throwable locationAware = null;
        Throwable result = null;
        Throwable contextMatch = null;
        // Guard against malicious overrides of Throwable.equals by
        // using a Set with identity equality semantics.
        Set<Throwable> dejaVu = Collections.newSetFromMap(new IdentityHashMap<>());

    otherwise. Do not persist these and assume they can be read by a future
    version of the library.

5.  Our classes are not designed to protect against a malicious caller. You
    should not use them for communication between trusted and untrusted code.

6.  For the mainline flavor, we test the libraries using OpenJDK 8, 11, and 17

     * and gives an attacker the ability to
     * <a href="https://max.computer/blog/how-to-take-over-the-computer-of-any-java-or-clojure-or-scala-developer/">serve malicious executable code onto the system.</a>
     * </b>
     * <p>
     * See also:

        // If we have the real hash of a JAR in those other coordinates, Gradle could overwrite and replace the real JAR with a malicious one
        !invalidLocation.exists()
    }

    def 'cannot write cache entries outside of dependency cache'() {
        given:
        def fakeDep = temporaryFolder.testDirectory.file('fake-repo/pwned.txt')

		switch strings.TrimSpace(p) {
		case dotdotComponent:
			return true
		case dotComponent:
			return true
		}
	}
	return false
}

// Check if client is sending a malicious request.
func hasMultipleAuth(r *http.Request) bool {
	authTypeCount := 0
	for _, hasValidAuth := range []func(*http.Request) bool{
		isRequestSignatureV2, isRequestPresignedSignatureV2,

// pipe, accept on a socket, and so on. We can't reasonably grab
// the lock across those operations.
//
// It is worse to inherit some file descriptors than others.
// If a non-malicious child accidentally inherits an open ordinary file,
// that's not a big deal. On the other hand, if a long-lived child
// accidentally inherits the write end of a pipe, then the reader

	r        *bufio.Reader
	n        uint64 // unread bytes in chunk
	err      error
	buf      [2]byte
	checkEnd bool  // whether need to check for \r\n chunk footer
	excess   int64 // "excessive" chunk overhead, for malicious sender detection
}

func (cr *chunkedReader) beginChunk() {
	// chunk-size CRLF
	var line []byte
	line, cr.err = readChunkLine(cr.r)
	if cr.err != nil {
		return
	}

Dependency verification is about **trust** in what you get and what you ship.

Without dependency verification it's easy for an attacker to compromise your supply chain.
There are many real world examples of tools compromised by adding a malicious dependency.
Dependency verification is meant to protect yourself from those attacks, by forcing you to ensure that the artifacts you include in your build are the ones that you expect.

	if s.HTTP2MaxStreamsPerConnection > 0 {
		http2Options.MaxConcurrentStreams = uint32(s.HTTP2MaxStreamsPerConnection)
	} else {
		// match http2.initialMaxConcurrentStreams used by clients
		// this makes it so that a malicious client can only open 400 streams before we forcibly close the connection
		// https://github.com/golang/net/commit/b225e7ca6dde1ef5a5ae5ce922861bda011cfabd
		http2Options.MaxConcurrentStreams = 100
	}